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COMMENTS
UNITED STATES FAIR EMPLOYMENT LAW IN
THE TRANSNATIONAL EMPLOYMENT ARENA:
THE CASE FOR THE EXTRATERRITORIAL
APPLICATION OF TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL
RIGHTS ACT OF 1964
With the steady expansion of United States corporate operations abroad'
in recent years has come a concomitant export of one of America's primary
resources, its labor force.2 The increasing presence of United States employ-
ers on foreign soil raises questions regarding such employers' amenability to
United States labor laws. In particular, the overseas employment relation-
ship between United States corporations and citizens implicates fair employ-
ment laws.3 Of primary concern is whether Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
1. A 1984 estimate indicated that approximately 21,000 foreign subsidiaries of over 2000
American corporations operate in more than 100 foreign countries. Street, Application of U.S.
Fair Employment Laws to Transnational Employers in the United States and Abroad, 19
N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 357, 358 (1987) (citing 1 WORLD TRADE ACADEMY PRESS, DIREC-
TORY OF AMERICAN FIRMS OPERATING IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES (10th ed. 1984)).
2. As of 1970, approximately 680,060 United States citizens were privately employed
abroad. Note, Equal Employment Opportunity for Americans Abroad, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1288
n.5 (1987) (citing SOCIAL & ECONOMIC STATISTICS ADMIN., BUREAU OF CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T
OF COMMERCE, AMERICANS LIVING ABROAD (1973)). This number has steadily increased, as
evidenced by a 1987 statistic indicating that 40,000 United States citizens live in Saudi Arabia
alone. Id. (citing Saudis Impose an Income Tax on Foreigners, N.Y. Times, Jan. 5, 1988, at
Al, col. 5).
3. The term "fair employment laws" encompasses the following: Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to e-17 (1988), which prohibits discrimination in em-
ployment on the basis of race, color, religion, sex or national origin; the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988), which prohibits discrimina-
tory employment practices undertaken because of an employee's age (over 40); and the Equal
Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1988), which guarantees men and women equality in
compensation and wages for performing identical or substantially similar duties. This Com-
ment is limited to a discussion of the extraterritorial application of Title VII.
Congress amended the ADEA in 1984 to provide for extraterritorial application to U.S.
citizens employed abroad by U.S. employers. Older Americans Act Amendments of 1984,
Pub. L. No. 98-459, 98 Stat. 1767, 1792 (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 623(h), 630(f)
(1988)). As noted by a House Conference report, the amendment broadens the definition of
the term "employee" by including any United States citizens "employed by a United States
1109
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of 1964 (Title VII)4 applies to extraterritorial acts of discrimination against
United States citizens by their United States employers.
Congress enacted Title VI 5 as part of a comprehensive program to en-
force equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment
6
to all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States.7 Most domestic
employers with fifteen employees or more are subject to the prohibitions of
the Civil Rights Act (the Act).' The issue of whether United States corpora-
tions may evade the broad guarantees of equal employment opportunity by
locating abroad, however, is unclear. Arguably, extraterritorial application
of Title VII may frustrate the perceived benefits of overseas operations.
Managerial evaluations of the advantages in locating a subsidiary or other
operation within a foreign country often center on the benefits derived from
the lack of mandatory compliance with United States labor laws.' Once a
corporation incorporates within this country, however, it should expect to be
amenable to the jurisdiction of our courts for violations of the civil rights of
our citizens regardless of where the violation occurs.
This Comment examines whether United States corporations may evade
the broad proscriptions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196410 by
establishing operations within a foreign country.'" First, this Comment ex-
amines the broad language and the legislative history of Title VII, as well as
employer in a workplace in a foreign country." H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1037, 98th Cong., 2d
Sess. 49 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2974, 3037.
Application of the Equal Pay Act is expressly limited to the territorial United States. The
Equal Pay Act is an addition to the minimum wage provisions of the Fair Labor Standards
Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1988), and incorporates section 213(f), which statutorily
confines its application to the United States.
4. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to e-17 (1982).
5. Id
6. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
7. The preamble to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 illustrates the congressional desire to
ensure equal protection of the laws by eliminating all forms of discrimination. The articulated
purposes of the act were:
To enforce the constitutional right to vote, to confer jurisdiction upon the district
courts of the United States to provide injunctive relief against discrimination in pub-
lic accommodations, to authorize the Attorney General to institute suits to protect
constitutional rights in public facilities and public education, to extend the Commis-
sion on Civil Rights, to prevent discrimination in federally assisted programs, to es-
tablish a commission on Equal Employment Opportunity, and for other purposes.
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (preamble).
8. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).
9. Street, supra note 1, at 359 (citing Jensen, Japanese-Style Work Code Works in
America, Too, Cleveland Plain Dealer, Mar. 13, 1983, at l-E, col. 1).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to e-17 (1988).
11. Specifically, this Comment explores whether United States citizens employed abroad
by United States corporations retain both the right to equality in employment opportunities
and the protection from discriminatory employment practices.
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judicial interpretations of the Act, to discern a congressional intent to apply
Title VII extraterritorially. Next, the Comment explores the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission's administrative interpretations of the extra-
territorial application of Title VII.12 This Comment then analyzes the most
recent judicial decision to examine the jurisdictional reach of Title VII, pay-
ing particular attention to the dissenting opinion and its alternative frame-
work for evaluating the extraterritorial application of Title VII. Finally, this
Comment concludes that an emphasis on judicial deference to administrative
interpretations of ambiguous statutory provisions will yield a result consis-
tent with the explicit language and the broad remedial purposes of the
statute.
I. TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964: THE FEDERAL
CODIFICATION OF EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES FOR EMPLOYMENT
A. The Broad Language of The Remedial Legislation
The extensive coverage provided in Title VII is a function of its remedial
purposes. 3 Specifically, Congress sought to achieve equal employment op-
portunities for all persons, regardless of their national origin, sex, religion,
race or color, through the elimination of past discriminatory employment
practices based on those characteristics.14 Section 701, the definitional sec-
tion of Title VII, delineates the pervasive coverage of the Act.15 The term
"person," as used throughout the Act, pertains to "individuals," as well as
to various governmental entities, both state and local, and their respective
agencies, labor organizations, and various business associations. 6 Title VII
proscribes unfair employment practices undertaken by "employers," '17 "em-
12. This section focuses primarily on a policy statement issued by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) regarding the investigation of charges of overseas
discrimination.
13. The minority report on H.R. 7152, which was the blueprint for the Civil Rights Act of
1964, states that the comprehensive nature of the bill reflects its broad purpose: To eliminate
racial prejudice throughout the nation. HOUSE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, HOUSE REPORT ON
THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963) (Additional
views on H.R. 7152 of Hon. William M. McCulloch, Hon. John V. Lindsay, Hon. William T.
Cahill, Hon. Garner E. Shriver, Hon. Clark MacGregor, Hon. Charles McC. Mathias, Hon.
James E. Bromwell), reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2391, 2488.
14. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973); Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971).
15. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1988).
16. Id. § 2000e(a).
17. See id. § 2000e(b), which provides in pertinent part:
The term "employer" means a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce
who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more
calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such a
person, but such term does not include (1) the United States, a corporation wholly
1990]
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ployment agencies,"'  and "labor organizations." 19  The Act guarantees
protection to "employees," defined as "individual[s] employed by an
employer."20
The proscriptions of Title VII apply only to employers "engaged in an
industry affecting commerce., 2  As evidenced by the language "trade, traf-
fic, commerce, transportation, transmission, or communication... between
a State and any place outside thereof,",22 the definition of "commerce" in-
cludes both interstate and foreign commerce. The definition of an "industry
affecting commerce" includes "any activity, business, or industry in com-
merce or in which a labor dispute would hinder or obstruct commerce or the
free flow of commerce.",
23
The express language of the statute does not evince any attempt by Con-
gress to limit the coverage of the Act to entities within the territorial United
States.24 Although Congress expressly exempted certain entities from cover-
age, 2 5 nowhere in the Act did Congress provide a corresponding exclusion to
owned by the Government of the United States, ... or (2) a bona fide private mem-
bership club (other than a labor organization) which is exempt from taxation ....
Id. (emphasis added).
18. See id. § 2000e(c), which provides that "[t]he term 'employment agency' means any
person regularly undertaking . . . to procure employees for an employer or to procure for
employees opportunities to work for an employer." Id.
19. See id. § 2000e(d), which provides in pertinent part that "[t]he term 'labor organiza-
tion' means a labor organization engaged in an industry affecting commerce ... in which
employees participate and which exists for the purpose ... of dealing with employers concern-
ing grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours, or other terms or conditions of em-
ployment." Id.
20. Id. § 2000e(f).
21. Id. § 2000e(b).
22. Id. § 2000e(g) (emphasis added). The term "State" as used within § 2000e, includes
"a State of the United States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Amer-
ican Samoa, Guam, Wake Island, the Canal Zone, and Outer Continental Shelf lands defined
in the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act." Id. § 2000e(i).
The use of the language "between a State and any place outside thereof" in this definition of
commerce leads to a logical inference that Congress anticipated some industries engaged in
foreign commerce would be covered by the Civil Rights Act. This language, however, does not
reveal whether Congress meant to include those industries located abroad whose business deal-
ings with the United States qualify as foreign commerce. This reference might be interpreted
to include only United States corporations which ship interstate or abroad.
23. Id. § 2000e(h).
24. See id. § 2000e.
25. See id. § 2000e-l, which provides in pertinent part:
This subchapter shall not apply to an employer with respect to the employment of
aliens outside any State, or to a religious corporation, association, educational insti-
tution, or society with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular reli-
gion to perform work connected with the carrying on by such corporation,
association, educational institution, or society of its activities.
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companies incorporated within the United States which operate abroad and
which fall within the statutory definition of employer.26
Although Congress' intent to remove racial barriers to employment
prompted the enactment of Title VII, the language of the statute indicates
that Congress also sought to protect other classes of minorities historically
subject to discriminatory employment practices. As a result, Congress pro-
vided that certain adverse employment actions, undertaken by a covered em-
ployer, would be unlawful if the employer acted because of an individual's
"race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.",2 7 Title VII specifies that an
employer violates the Act if the employer discharges, refuses to hire, or in
some way "discriminate[s] against any individual with respect to his com-
pensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of [the
individual's protected status]."2
In enacting Title VII, Congress recognized that, in certain limited situa-
tions, an employer might be justified in its decision to hire or employ an
individual solely on the basis of that person's religion, sex, or national ori-
gin.29 In these limited situations, Title VII provides the employer with an
affirmative defense to an otherwise unlawful employment practice.30 The
"bona fide occupational qualification" (BFOQ) defense allows an employer
to base an employment decision on the religion, sex or national origin of an
individual when absolutely required by the nature of the employer's busi-
Id.
The alien exemption provision, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1, which exempts from Title VII protec-
tion any alien employed overseas by a covered employer is perhaps the strongest indication
that Congress intended Title VII to reach acts of discrimination by United States employers
abroad against their United States citizen-employees. This negative implication of the alien
exemption provision is discussed more fully infra, at notes 51-65 and accompanying text.
26. Nor did Congress expressly indicate that Title VII shall apply to such entities.
27. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) to (d).
28. Id. § 2000e-2(a) (1).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) prohibits an employer from discriminating against an employee be-
cause the employee has "opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this
[title], or because [the employee] has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any
manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this [title]." Id. This is known as the
opposition-participation clause, which prohibits an employer from retaliating against his em-
ployee for invoking the Title VII process.
29. Id. § 2000e-2(e).
30. Id.
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ness.3 1 As evidenced by the language of this provision, race or color can
never qualify as a BFOQ.32
Congress entrusted the responsibility of ensuring compliance with the
mandates of Title VII to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC or Commission).3 3 With respect to charges of employment discrimi-
nation in the private sector, the EEOC acts in a prosecutorial capacity.34
The enforcement process begins when an individual files a charge with the
Commission. 3" The Commission investigates the charge to determine
whether there is reasonable cause to believe that the employer engaged in an
unlawful employment practice.36 If the Commission finds reasonable cause
to believe that a violation of Title VII occurred, it then attempts to reconcile
the individual's grievance with the employer.37 If conciliation fails, the
Commission may decide to litigate the case on behalf of the aggrieved
party.31 If the Commission decides not to litigate, the aggrieved party may
file a civil action in federal court.39
B. References in the Legislative History of the Act Supporting
Extraterritorial Application of Title VII
The congressional power to regulate both interstate and foreign commerce
supported the enactment of such a sweeping legislative measure as the Civil
Rights Act of 19 64 .40 Although Congress did not specifically define com-
merce in Title VII to include "foreign commerce,, 41 statements by the spon-
sors of the bill, made prior to the enactment of the Act, indicate a
31. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) provides:
[I]t shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire and em-
ploy employees ... on the basis of his religion, sex, or national origin in those certain
instances where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualifica-




33. Id. § 2000e-4.
34. Id. § 2000e-5. In this section of the Act, Congress authorized the EEOC to bring
lawsuits against violators of the Act on behalf of aggrieved individuals.
35. Id. § 2000e-5(b).
36. Id
37. Id.
38. Id. § 2000e-5(f).
39. Id
40. STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES CIVIL RIGHTS, Part II, 1226 (B.
Schwartz ed. 1970) (statement of Senator Humphrey that "[t]he constitutional basis for Title
VII is... the commerce clause"); see also Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S.
241 (1964); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
41. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(g) (1988).
1114 [Vol. 39:1109
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congressional intent to extend coverage of the Act to entities engaged in
foreign commerce.42 A sponsor of the Civil Rights Act of 196443 stated that
the Act covers any employer whose business involves interstate or foreign
commerce." Similarly, during the House debates on the bill, one congress-
man indicated that Congress intended Title VII to cover employers in indus-
tries engaged in foreign commerce.45
Other pronouncements by members of Congress support the application
of Title VII to claims of discrimination made by United States citizens
against United States corporations operating abroad." The House Report
on the bill evinces a primary concern to "protect and provide more effective
means to enforce the civil rights of persons within the jurisdiction of the
United States."'47 In this regard, one congressman stated that the provisions
of Title VII were necessary to enforce the constitutional guarantees of equal-
ity.4" Similarly, the ranking minority member of the House Judiciary Coin-
42. EEOC, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TrrLEs VII AND XI OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS AcT
OF 1964, at 3091; 110 CONG. REC. 2737 (1964) (statement of Rep. Libonati).
43. That sponsor was Congressman Emmanuel Celler of New York, the Chairman of the
House Judiciary Committee.
44. EEOC, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLES VII AND XI OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT
OF 1964, at 3091.
45. Congressman Libonati, of Illinois, stated:
[The provisions [of Title VII] are necessary "to remove obstructions to the free flow
of commerce among the States and with foreign nations" . . . Title VII is simply
supported by Congress [sic] power to regulate commerce among the States and with
foreign nations - Article I, section 8, clause 3.
Title VII covers employers engaged in industries affecting commerce - interstate,
and foreign commerce ....
110 CONG. REC. 2737 (1964) (statement of Rep. Libonati).
Similarly, Senator Humphrey stated that the commerce clause, which supports Title VII,
"authorizes Congress to enact legislation to regulate employment relations which affect inter-
state and foreign commerce." STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES CIVIL RIGHTS,
Part II, 1226 (B. Schwartz ed. 1970).
46. See 110 CONG. REc. 2737 (1964); HOUSE REPORT ON CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964,
H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD-
MIN. NEWS 2391, 2488.
47. HOUSE REPORT ON THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE. CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2391. The
jurisdiction of the United States is not limited to acts committed within the territorial confines
of the country. Congress does have the power to prescribe the activities of U.S. citizens
outside the territorial jurisdiction. Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 287 (1952);
Kawakita v. United States, 343 U.S. 717, 733 (1952); Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421,
443 (1932); Cook v. Tait, 265 U.S. 47, 56 (1924); United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94
(1922).
48. 110 CONG. REC. 2737 (1964) (statement of Rep. Libonati). Congressman Libonati
stated that the Act will "insure the complete and free enjoyment by all persons of the rights,
privileges, and immunities secured and protected by the Constitution of the United States."
Id.
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mittee illustrated the broad scope of the legislation by arguing that Congress
desired to "secure to all Americans the equal protection of the laws of the
United States."49 These general pronouncements regarding the applicability
of Title VII to industries engaged in foreign commerce, as well as the ex-
pressed intent to ensure that all Americans enjoy the protections of the Act,
provide a strong indication that Congress did not envision the Act to have
any territorial limitations.50
C The Alien Exemption Provision
Congress explicitly exempted certain organizations from the broad cover-
age of Title VII. 1 One of these exemptions, the alien exemption provision of
section 702, which exempts overseas employers from coverage in their em-
ployment relationship with aliens abroad, lends support to the proposition
that Title VII applies extraterritorially.5 2 In section 702, the only provision
that specifically concerns employment abroad, Congress chose not to exempt
corporations incorporated within the United States and operating abroad, or
United States citizens employed by such corporations.53 Arguably, the stat-
utory definitions of "employer" and "employee" are broad enough to en-
compass United States corporations and United States citizens abroad
within the coverage of the Act.54
The legislative history of Title VII indicates that Congress inserted the
alien exemption provision within the Act as a self-executing measure to avert
conflicts between United States and foreign law that would otherwise arise if
the Act applied to aliens employed abroad by United States corporations."
Careful consideration of this legislative purpose leads to the logical inference
49. HOUSE REPORT ON CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2391, 2488 (statement of
Rep. McCulloch). The minority report also states that "[t]he rights of citizenship mean little if
an individual is unable to gain the economic wherewithal to enjoy or properly utilize them."
Id. at 2516. This statement lends support to the proposition that Congress intended Title VII
to have far reaching effects. Moreover, it demonstrates the broad remedial purposes behind
the legislation.
50. See supra notes 43-49 and accompanying text.
51. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (1988); see supra note 25 and accompanying text.
52. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-l. This provision exempts an employer from coverage "with re-
spect to the employment of aliens outside any State." Id.
53. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e.
54. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(b), 2000e(f); see also supra notes 17, 20 and accompanying text.
55. See Boureslan v. Aramco, 857 F.2d 1014, 1020 (quoting Civil Rights: Hearings on
HR. 7152, as amended by Subcommittee No. 5 before the House Committee on the Judiciary,
88th Cong., 1st Sess. 2303 (1963)), cert. granted sub nom. EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co.,
111 S. Ct. 40 (1990). The following statement appeared in a house report (H.R. REP. No. 405,
88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963)) which was then incorporated within the hearings and debates on
H.R. 7152, the precursor of the Civil Rights Act of 1963.
1116 [Vol. 39:1109
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that a United States employer, operating overseas and otherwise covered by
the Act, may be engaged in an "industry affecting commerce." 6 If the em-
ployer employed the statutory minimum number of employees, that em-
ployer would fall within the statutory definition of "employer" and would be
prohibited from violating the Act. Otherwise, Congress would not have spe-
cifically exempted this employment relationship from the proscriptions of
the Act.5 7 The reason for this inference is clear: by expressly exempting
aliens employed abroad from protection against employment discrimination
because of the potential for conflicts between United States and foreign law,
Congress implicitly recognized that certain United States corporations oper-
ating abroad might be engaged in an industry affecting commerce. 58 There
would be no logical reason to consider the possibility of conflicts of law
problems with respect to aliens employed by United States employers abroad
unless Congress realized that the broad definition of "employer" encom-
passed these overseas employers. Because an act of Congress that might
apply to citizens of foreign countries would affront traditional notions of
sovereignty and comity, 9 Congress wisely legislated around this problem by
explicitly exempting overseas United States employers from coverage with
In section 4 of the Act, limited exception is provided for employers with respect to
employment of aliens outside of any state .... The intent of [this] exemption is to
remove conflicts of law which might otherwise exist between the United States and a
foreign nation in the employment of aliens outside the United States by an American
enterprise.
Id.
Possible conflicts of law arise if the laws regarding employment of the foreign country in
which the United States corporation operates are diametrically opposed to the provisions of
Title VII. For example, in Saudi Arabia, it is against the law for women to work side-by-side
with men and foreigners. See Note, United States Corporations Operating in Saudi Arabia and
Laws Affecting Discrimination in Employment: Which Law Shall Prevail?, 8 LoY. L.A. INT'L
& COMP. L.J. 135, 144 n.75 (1985) (citing D. PIPES, IN THE PATH OF GOD: ISLAM AND
POLITICAL POWER 234 (1983)).
56. EEOC Policy Guidance: Application of Title VII to American Companies Overseas,
Their Subsidiaries, and to Foreign Companies, No. N-915.033, EEOC Release No. 880P-15,
reprinted in EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) 2391, 2392, § 605, Appendix 605-M ( 2187) (Sept. 2,
1988) [hereinafter The Policy Guidance].
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69, 73 (1941) (legislation that regulates actions of U.S.
citizens and corporations should not infringe upon the sovereignty of another nation); see So-
ciete Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States Dist. Court, 482 U.S. 522, 543 n.27
(1987) (in resolving disputes in which the interests of both the U.S. and a foreign nation are
involved, a domestic court should be constrained by notions of comity and respect); Laker
Airways, Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 937 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("the
obligation of comity expires when the strong public policies of the forum are vitiated by the
foreign act").
1990] 1117
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respect to employment discrimination against the citizen-employees in the
host nation.
The clear import of the alien exemption provision is that, but for the pro-
vision, Title VII would cover instances of employment discrimination by
overseas United States employers against their non-United States citizen-em-
ployees. Because Congress did not attempt to exempt acts of discrimination
against United States citizens employed overseas by these same United
States employers within any provision of Title VII, a negative inference ex-
ists regarding the alien exemption provision:' by exempting employers
abroad from coverage with respect to their alien employees, Congress in-
tended that United States citizens employed in such situations should be
covered by the Act.61
The United States Supreme Court, in Espinoza v. Farah Manufacturing
Co., 62 discussed another possible interpretation of the alien exemption provi-
sion. In Espinoza, the plaintiff, a Mexican citizen, argued that her United
States employer discriminated against her on the basis of her national origin
because the employer required United States citizenship of all his employ-
ees. 63 Specifically, the Court, in holding that aliens employed within the
United States had standing to bring discrimination suits under Title VII,
stated that Congress intended the Act to apply to aliens employed within the
United States, thus eliminating any distinction between aliens and citizens
within the territorial jurisdiction of United States courts." The Espinoza
Court noted that the exclusion of aliens employed outside the United States
indicates Congress' clear intent to protect aliens employed within the United
States.
65
II. THE EXERCISE OF EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION: AN
EXAMINATION OF JUDICIAL DETERMINATIONS REGARDING
THE JURISDICTIONAL REACH OF TITLE VII
Only a handful of federal courts have considered whether Title VII applies
to acts of discrimination in the employment relationship between United
60. The Policy Guidance, supra note 56, at 2392.
61. Love v. Pullman Co., 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 423, 425 (D. Colo. 1976), aff'd
on other grounds, 569 F.2d 1074 (10th Cir. 1978); Bryant v. International School Servs., Inc.,
502 F. Supp. 472 (D.N.J. 1980), rev'd on other grounds, 675 F.2d 562 (3d Cir. 1982). Both of
these cases are discussed fully at infra notes 67-92 and accompanying text.
62. 414 U.S. 86 (1973).
63. Id. at 87.




States citizens and their foreign United States employers." The United
States District Court for the District of Colorado first considered the extra-
territorial application of Title VII in Love v. Pullman Co. 67 In Love, a class
of Black employees brought suit against the Pullman railroad company.68
Pullman, a United States company, operated out of Montreal, Canada.69
The plaintiffs claimed that they were discriminatorily refused promotion to
the position of "conductor," a position traditionally dominated by white em-
ployees.70 Their claim centered on the fact that, while both groups of em-
ployees performed essentially similar duties, the predominantly white
conductors received substantially higher wages.7 1 The class of plaintiffs in-
cluded both United States and Canadian citizens who worked routes in both
countries.72
The district court relied primarily on the alien exemption provision in de-
termining the relief due to the Canadian porters who worked part of their
time in the United States.7" Noting that the express terms of the provision
do not protect aliens from acts of discrimination occurring outside of the
United States, the court determined that under the Supreme Court's inter-
pretation of the provision in Espinoza, 4 aliens employed within the United
States in industries affecting commerce were entitled to rely on the protec-
tions of Title VII.7' The district court determined that the Canadian porters
should receive backpay based on the salary of a conductor calculated to re-
flect the amount of time they actually worked within the United States.
7 6
As for citizens of the United States, the district court determined that they
would be entitled to full relief for both the time they worked in the United
66. See Boureslan v. Aramco, 857 F.2d 1014 (1988), cert. granted sub nom. EEOC v.
Arabian American Oil Co., 111 S. Ct. 40 (1990); Seville v. Martin Marietta Corp., 638 F.
Supp. 590 (D. Md. 1986); Bryant v. International School Servs., Inc., 502 F. Supp. 472 (D.N.J.
1980), rev'd on other grounds, 675 F.2d 562 (3d Cir. 1982); Love v. Pullman, 13 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 423 (D. Colo. 1976), aff'd on other grounds, 569 F.2d 1074 (10th Cir. 1978).
67. 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 423 (D. Colo. 1976), aff'd on other grounds, 569 F.2d
1074 (10th Cir. 1978).
68. Id. at 425.
69. Id. at 426.
70. Love, 569 F.2d at 1076.
71. Id. Pullman designated the class of plaintiffs, a group of porters, as "porters-in-
charge". Id. The only duty distinguishing the porters-in-charge from the conductors was their
supervisory role over the porters; otherwise, once an employee qualified for the porter position,
no further training was required for promotion to conductor. Id.
72. Love, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 425-26.
73. Id. at 426.
74. Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 95 (1973).
75. Love, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 426.
76. IL
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States and in Canada. 77 The district court based this conclusion on the neg-
ative inference accorded the alien exemption provision.7 ' The district court
stated that Title VII must be construed to protect United States citizens em-
ployed abroad by United States corporations engaged in an industry affect-
ing commerce. 79 The district court relied on section 702 of Title VII's
explicit exclusion of aliens employed abroad to justify this conclusion.80
While noting that the legislative history of the Act did not expressly support
this position, the court strongly relied on the absence of any contradictory
language as sufficient evidence of congressional intent to protect United
States citizens employed by United States employers overseas."1
The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey explicitly
adopted the Love court's interpretation of the alien exemption provision in
Bryant v. International School Services, Inc. (ISS).12 In Bryant, two married
female employees sued ISS claiming that its practice of awarding employ-
ment contracts with fewer benefits to women married to employees of ISS in
Iran constituted unlawful sex discrimination."3 The district court denied the
defendant's motion to dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdic-
tion." The defendant claimed that the provisions of Title VII should not be
given extraterritorial effect."5 In rejecting the arguments advanced by ISS,86
the court emphatically stated that not only did Congress clearly intend Title
VII to apply extraterritorially, but also the plain language of the statute sup-
ported such a conclusion. 7 Relying on the premise that Congress is empow-
ered to adopt legislation that could reach the acts of American citizens
abroad,88 the court determined that the express exclusion of aliens employed
outside the United States mandated the conclusion that Americans em-
ployed by a covered employer abroad are protected by Title VII. 9 Next, the
court addressed ISS' argument that Title VII should be denied extraterrito-




81. Id. The court supported this conclusion with cases applying the antitrust laws extra-
territorially. Id. (citing Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690
(1962)).
82. 502 F. Supp. 472 (D.N.J. 1980), rev'd on other grounds, 675 F.2d. 562 (3d Cir. 1982).
83. Id. at 479.
84. Id. at 481.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 482.
87. Id.
88. Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281 (1949); Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S.
421 (1932).
89. Bryant, 502 F. Supp. at 482.
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rial effect because other labor laws are limited to the territorial United
States.9° The court noted that such limited statutes do not contain language
similar to the alien exemption provision of Title VII. 91 Therefore, the dis-
trict court asserted that ISS misplaced its reliance on those statutes.92
In Seville v. Martin Marietta Corp.,93 the United States District Court for
the District of Maryland denied the defendant's jurisdictional challenge to
the extraterritorial reach of Title VII by explicitly adopting the Love and
Bryant courts' construction of the alien exemption provision.94 The defend-
ant, Martin Marietta, was a United States corporation operating a facility in
Frankfurt, West Germany.95 The plaintiffs, four females who were locally
hired to work at the Frankfurt facility as clerical employees, challenged the
defendant's policy of awarding greater fringe benefits to "technical" employ-
ees than to "clerical" employees on the basis of sex discrimination.96 The
evidence indicated that clerical employees were mostly women, while techni-
cal employees were both men and women.97 The court granted summary
judgment to the defendant on the grounds that the company had established
reasonable nondiscriminatory reasons for distinguishing between the two
classes of employees. 98
A few federal courts decided the merits of Title VII claims, which clearly
involved extraterritorial implications of the Act, without addressing the ju-
risdictional reach of the Act.99 In these cases, the extraterritorial nature of
the employment practice in some way impacted upon the employee's terms
and conditions of employment within the United States. In Fernandez v.
Wynn Oil Co., "o Wynn Oil denied Fernandez, a female employee, a promo-
90. Id. at 483.
91. Id.
92. Id. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in reversing the district court's find-
ing that the plaintiffs had demonstrated both disparate impact and treatment, noted that "[o]ur
holding in no way answers the questions raised by appellee's jurisdictional challenge. No court
has decided the extraterritorial applicability of Title VII and we find it unnecessary to do so to
decide this case." 675 F.2d 562, 577 n.23 (1982).
93. 638 F. Supp. 590 (D. Md. 1986).
94. Id. at 592.
95. Idl at 591.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 593.
98. Id. at 595.
99. See Kern v. Dynalectron Corp., 577 F. Supp. 1196 (N.D. Tex. 1983), aff'd menm, 746
F.2d 810 (5th Cir. 1984); Mas Marques v. Digital Equip. Corp., 490 F. Supp. 56 (D. Mass.),
aff'd, 637 F.2d 24 (1st Cir. 1980); Linskey v. Heidelberg Eastern, Inc., 470 F. Supp. 1181
(E.D.N.Y. 1979); Fernandez v. Wynn Oil Co., 20 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1162 (C.D.
Cal. 1979), aff'd, 653 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1981).
100. 20 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1162 (C.D. Cal. 1979), aff'd, 653 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir.
1981).
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tion to a position as Director of International Operations because the corpo-
rate officers believed that their Latin American clientele would not respond
favorably to a woman executive.'°' The position involved cultivation of cli-
ents and new business within Latin America, and would have required Fer-
nandez to spend time in Latin America during business trips. 02 In holding
that the alleged preferences of Wynn's Latin American clientele did not
qualify as a "bona fide occupational qualification" for the position sought by
the plaintiff, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit did
not consider whether Title VII would reach the extraterritorial nature of the
claim.103 The plaintiff did not prevail on the merits of her Title VII claim,
however, because the court found that she was not qualified for the posi-
tion. " Presumably, if she had been qualified, the discriminatory refusal to
promote her into the position would have adversely impacted upon her em-
ployment opportunities abroad, thereby presenting a viable issue of Title
VII's extraterritorial reach.'0 5
In Kern v. Dynalectron Corp., 1  the defendant, an American corporation
operating a helicopter service in Saudi Arabia, required all of its pilots flying
over the Islamic holy city of Mecca to convert to the Islamic faith. 107 The
plaintiff, Kern, sued Dynalectron when the corporation terminated him after
he refused to convert. The corporation justified its policy as mandated by
Saudi law, which prohibited non-Muslims from entering Mecca under pen-
alty of death.'o 8 The United States District Court for the Northern District
of Texas held that, although Kern established a prima facie case of religious
discrimination, the discrimination was lawful.l°9 The district court based its
decision on a valid religious BFOQ exception, reasoning that being Muslim
was an "absolute prerequisite" for performing the job.110 The situation
presented in Kern was similar to the facts in Fernandez, not only because the
alleged unfair employment practice of the employer would have effected the
101. Id. at 1165. Two employees of Wynn testified that employing the plaintiff in this
position would have had an adverse effect on the company's Latin American business. Id.
102. Id. at 1163.
103. 653 F.2d at 1275-77; see supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
104. Id. at 1276.
105. For an informative discussion of this case and the problems of customer preference as
a BFOQ defense to a Title VII claim, see Note, Employment Discrimination - US. Employers
in Foreign Countries: Is Customer Preference a Bona Fide Occupational Qualification? - Fer-
nandez v. Wynn Oil Co., 31 U. KAN. L. REv. 183 (1982).
106. 577 F. Supp. 1196 (N.D. Tex. 1983), aff'd mem., 746 F.2d 810 (5th Cir. 1984).
107. Id. at 1198.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1203.
110. Id. at 1202.
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plaintiff's opportunities for employment abroad, but also because the court
did not discuss the issue of the extraterritorial reach of Title VII.
III. THE INTERPRETATIONS OF THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION REGARDING THE
EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF TITLE VII
A. The Commission Expands the Scope of Title VII
Generally, courts accord great deference to the interpretation of a statute
by an administrative agency entrusted with the enforcement of that stat-
ute."' Courts have recognized an exception to this general rule, however,
when the application of agency guidelines or regulations contravenes the ob-
vious congressional intent, or when compelling indications demonstrate that
the agency's interpretation is incorrect."12 Courts ordinarily defer to the
opinions of the EEOC,1 3 the administrative agency authorized to bring en-
forcement proceedings to prevent unlawful employment practices.'1 4 This
concept of judicial deference applies to both formal regulations promulgated
under the Act as well as informal interpretations of the Act by the agency.' 15
Over the years, the Commission has consistently expressed the opinion
that Title VII applies to extraterritorial acts of discrimination. In an opinion
letter regarding the application of the Act, the Commission General Counsel
stressed that the alien exemption provision of Title VII indicates a congres-
sional intent supporting extraterritorial application." 6 Underscoring that
Congress did not intend Title VII to apply to aliens employed outside of any
state, the General Counsel opined that the obvious and meaningful interpre-
tation of the provision is that Congress meant to provide coverage for citi-
zens employed by United States corporations operating overseas." 7
111. Aluminum Co. of America v. Central Lincoln Peoples' Util. Dist., 467 U.S. 380, 389
(1984) (the interpretation of a statute by the administering agency is entitled to a substantial
degree of deference).
112. Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 94-95 (1973).
113. Espinoza, 414 U.S. at 94; McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 279
(1976); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971).
114. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a) (1988).
115. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 430-31 (1975). The Supreme
Court, in considering the deference to be given a set of guidelines issued by the EEOC regard-
ing the method of determining the job-relatedness of employment tests, held that even though
the guidelines were not formal administrative regulations, the guidelines were" '[t]he adminis-
trative interpretation of the Act by the enforcing agency,' and consequently they [were] 'enti-
tled to great deference.'" (quoting Griggs, 401 U.S. at 433-34).
116. See Note, Civil Rights in Employment and the Multinational Corporations, 10 COR-
NELL INT'L L.J. 87, 104 (1976) (quoting Opinion letter from William Carey, EEOC General
Counsel, to Sen. Frank Church (Mar. 14, 1975)).
117. Id. The pertinent text of this letter follows in part:
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Other important agency officials have offered similar opinions on the juris-
dictional reach of Title VII. During the congressional hearings on the 1984
amendments to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), the
Chairman of the EEOC argued that Congress should amend the ADEA to
provide extraterritorial coverage for acts of age discrimination occurring
overseas.11 The Chairman pointed out that the need for an express amend-
ment followed from the ADEA's lack of a provision similar to the alien
exemption provision of Title VII which, he argued, applies extraterritori-
ally.1 19 One author has commented that because Congress subsequently
amended the ADEA to provide extraterritorial application and did not simi-
larly amend Title VII, a permissible inference may be drawn that Congress
already considered Title VII to have extraterritorial effect. 120
In addition to comments of various agency officials, the Commission has
asserted jurisdiction in a number of cases involving extraterritorial discrimi-
Giving Section 702 [the alien exemption provision] its normal meaning would indi-
cate a Congressional intent to exclude from the coverage of the statute aliens em-
ployed by covered employers working in the employers' operations outside of the
United States.
The reason for such exclusion is obvious; employment conditions in foreign coun-
tries are beyond the control of Congress. The section does not similarly exempt from
the provision of the Act, U.S. Citizens [sic] employed abroad by U.S. employers. If
Section 702 is to have any meaning at all, therefore, it is necessary to construe it as
expressing a Congressional intent to extend coverage of Title VII to include employ-
ment conditions of citizens in overseas operations of domestic corporations at the
same time it excludes aliens of the domestic corporation from the operation of the
statute.
118. Age Discrimination and Overseas Americans, 1983: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Aging of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4 (1983)
(statement of Clarence Thomas, Chairman of the EEOC).
119. Id. The relevant portions of Chairman Thomas' statements are as follows:
In contrast [to the ADEA], [T]itle VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as
amended, which EEOC also enforces, does apply extraterritorially because [of] sec-
tion 702 of [T]itle VII (the alien exemption provision]
This provision indicates, by implication, that Congress intended [T]itle VII to pro-
tect American employees working for American employers outside the United States.
The lack of any similar language in the ADEA further supports the conclusion that
the ADEA cannot be applied to acts that occur outside this country.
It can be argued that the ADEA should be amended to provide extraterritorial
coverage to Americans working in foreign countries for American companies. This
is underscored by [T]itle VII's extraterritorial application and the long-recognized
fact that the purposes and goals of the two statutes are parallel, that is, to eliminate
discrimination in employment.
Id.
120. See Street, supra note 1, at 371.
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natory employment practices. In EEOC Commission Decision 84-2,21 the
Commission determined that a Japanese corporation came under the pur-
view of the Act even though it did not do any business within the United
States. 122 The corporation recruited some of its employees through a Uni-
versity placement office in the United States to work at facilities in Japan.123
The University arranged for a female applicant to interview with the corpo-
ration on campus. The applicant, however, had car trouble and informed
the University that she could not keep the appointment. 124 When she later
attempted to obtain an interview at another time and place, the corporation
refused to grant her request or accept her resume. 125 The applicant argued
that, because of this action, the University and the corporation discriminated
against her on the basis of sex. 126 The Commission held, however, that rea-
sonable cause did not exist from the evidence to believe that either the corpo-
ration or the University engaged in an unfair employment practice. 127 The
Commission based this conclusion on the lack of evidence that the employer
would have accepted a resume or granted an interview to a male who simi-
larly failed to attend a scheduled interview.' 21 If evidence existed to warrant
a reasonable cause finding, the Commission stated that it would not hesitate
to apply Title VII.129 Although the recruitment activity at issue in this deci-
sion occurred within the territory of the United States, if either the Univer-
sity or the corporation had engaged in discriminatory policies with respect to
recruitment, the actions would have impacted upon the applicant's employ-
ment opportunities abroad.
The Commission shortly thereafter confronted the question of Title VII's
extraterritorial application. Commission Decision 85-16130 involved a situa-
tion factually similar to Bryant. 13' The Charging Party132 filed charges
against Respondent A, a United States corporation operating abroad, 133 and
121. EEOC Decision 84-2, 33 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1893 (Dec. 2, 1983).
122. Id. at 1894-95.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 1894.
125. Id
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1896.
128. Id.
129. Id. The Commission noted that it had jurisdiction over both the Japanese corporation
and the University placement office, which it determined acted as an employment agency. Id.
130. EEOC Decision 85-16, Employment Practices Guide (CCH) 6857 (Sept. 16, 1985).
131. Bryant v. International School Servs., Inc., 502 F. Supp. 472 (D.N.J. 1980), rev'd on
other grounds, 675 F.2d 562 (3d Cir. 1982); see supra notes 82-92 and accompanying text.
132. The term "Charging Party" refers to the individual filing a charge of discrimination
with the EEOC.
133. EEOC Decision 85-16, Empl. Prac. Guide (CCH) 6856, at 7071. Respondent A
maintained an office in the United States solely for the purpose of communicating with the
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Respondent B, a corporation wholly owned by Respondent A, incorporated
and located in the United States.134 Respondent B recruited American citi-
zens for employment abroad with Respondent A. 135
The Charging Party challenged the system utilized by Respondent A to
classify its United States employees. 136 Employees were either termed "reg-
ular expatriate", which connoted that they were hired in the United States
through Respondent B's services,' 37 or "casual employees," wives of the ex-
patriate employees.138 Accordingly, neither males nor nationals of the coun-
try could be classed as casual employees. 139 Only nationals and expatriate
employees were given the opportunity to participate in the savings and pen-
sion plans offered by Respondent A."4 The Charging Party, a casual em-
ployee, alleged that the practice of excluding casual employees from
Respondent A's benefit plan constituted discrimination on the basis of sex
and national origin.' 4 '
As a preliminary matter, the Commission noted that discriminatory em-
ployment practices against United States citizens occurring in overseas em-
ployment by United States employers are not excluded from the coverage of
the Act.'4 2 The Commission adopted the negative inference of the alien ex-
emption provision, and determined that United States citizens are protected
from acts of discrimination by covered employers abroad. 4 3
Although advocating extraterritorial application of the Act, the Commis-
sion proceeded cautiously to determine whether the particular facts justified
application of the Act. Specifically, the Commission addressed Respondent
A's contention of improper jurisdiction because Respondent A was not "do-
ing business" within the United States.'" The Commission noted that the
paucity of reference to "doing business" as a criteria in the statutory defini-
tion of "employer" rendered Respondent A's argument deficient. The Coin-
United States Department of State and other governmental, diplomatic and international agen-
cies. Id. Although Respondent A maintained control over all of its stock, the foreign country
in which it was located owned Respondent A's assets. Id. Respondent A merely managed and




137. Id. Regular expatriate employees were not nationals of the foreign country in which
Respondent A operated. Id.
138. Id. All the casual employees were women; none were nationals of the foreign country









mission then stated that the proper analysis in this situation involved a
determination of whether the exercise of jurisdiction offends the principles of
due process. 4 5
Employing an amalgam of the tests utilized by the Supreme Court to de-
termine whether jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant violates due pro-
cess, "' the Commission established a paradigm for cases involving Title VII
charges of extraterritorial discrimination.14 7 The Commission's test scruti-
nized the relationship between the employer, the claimed discriminatory em-
ployment practice and the United States. 4 In analyzing the relationship
between the discriminatory act and the United States, the Commission pro-
ceeded from the premise that Congress prohibited extraterritorial acts of dis-
crimination in Title VII. 49 The Commission's determination that
Respondent A satisfied Title VII's definition of employer and that the em-
ployer's action constituted a form of employment discrimination proscribed
by the statute established the nexus between the alleged discriminatory act
and the United States.1 5
0
In determining whether the requisite connection existed between Respon-
dent A and the forum, the Commission enumerated the various contacts
between Respondent A and the United States,15 ' and found that these con-
tacts were sufficient to support an exercise of jurisdiction within the stric-
tures of due process.' 52 The Commission refrained from reaching the merits
of the charges, however, because the possibility that Respondent A's actions
were mandated by foreign law had not been thoroughly investigated.
5 3
145. Id. at 7072-73.
146. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977) (the critical element in determining per-
sonal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant entails an inquiry into the relationship among
the defendant, the forum, and the issue in litigation); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253
(1958) (for due process to be satisfied the defendant must have "purposefully avail[ed] itself of
the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and
protections of its laws"); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (a
non-resident defendant must have some "minimum contacts with [the forum] such that the
maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial jus-
tice'" inherent in due process).
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B. The EEOC Policy Statement Regarding the Extraterritorial Application
of Title VII
On September 2, 1988, the EEOC issued a position statement regarding
the extraterritorial application of Title VII.'5 4 The primary purpose of this
"policy guidance" was to clarify the situations in which Title VII applies to
employment discrimination by both United States and foreign corporations,
against United States citizens and aliens, in the United States and abroad.' 55
1. The Extraterritorial Application of Title VII: The EEOC's
Legislative Analysis
Cognizant of the congressional power to enact legislation prescribing the
acts of United States citizens abroad 156 and the concomitant requirement
that congressional intent supporting extraterritoriality must be prevalent for
legislation to be given extraterritorial effect, 157 the Commission proceeded to
analyze relevant excerpts of the legislative history of Title VII to discern
whether such an intent exists. 158 The examination focused on congressional
statements indicating that the commerce power supported the enactment of
Title VII as an effort to abolish existing barriers to the free flow of both
154. The Policy Guidance, supra note 56, at 2391.
155. Id. The Commission's statement also provides guidance as to the application of Title
VII to aliens employed in the United States, whether residing in the United States and whether
all or part of their work is done in the United States. Id.
Unfortunately, due to the expansive nature of the materials dealing with the application of
Title VII to foreign corporations and multinationals within the United States, this aspect of the
policy statement will not be covered. For a competent and interesting discussion of the various
problems involved in applying Title VII to foreign corporations in the United States, see Note,
Subsidiary Assertion of Foreign Parent Corporation Rights Under Commercial Treaties to Hire
Employees "Of Their Choice, " 86 COLUM. L. REv. 139 (1986); Lansing and Palmer, Sumitomo
Shoji v. Avagliano: Sayonara to Japanese Employment Practices in Conflict With Title VII, 28
ST. Louis U.L.J. 153 (1984); Note, The Rights of a Foreign Corporation and Its Subsidiary
Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and
Navigation, 17 GEo. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 607 (1983); Sethi and Swanson, Are Foreign
Multinationals Violating US. Civil Rights Laws?, 4 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 485 (1979).
156. The Policy Guidance, supra note 56, at 2391 (citing United States v. Bowman, 260
U.S. 94 (1922)).
157. Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949) (as a canon of construction,
courts will presume that legislation only applies to acts occuring within the territorial jurisdic-
tion of the U.S. unless a contrary legislative intent appears within the statute).
158. The Policy Guidance, supra note 56, at 2391. The Commission noted that even where




interstate and foreign commerce1 59 as well as to ensure to all persons within
the United States equal protection and enjoyment of the laws.' 60
Turning to principles of statutory construction, the Commission noted
that, generally, statutory exemptions are narrowly construed' 6' to ensure
that the exemption is interpreted in a manner that directly correlates with
the purposes of the statute. 62 Applying this rule of construction to the alien
exemption provision, the Commission acknowledged the susceptibility of the
provision to a negative implication.163 Specifically, the EEOC noted that, by
offering no protection from discriminatory employment practices of United
States employers to aliens employed abroad, Congress implied that the over-
seas operations of certain United States corporations may be extensive
enough to bring their operations within Title VII's definition of an "industry
affecting commerce" and, therefore, within the statutory definition of em-
ployer."'6 Accordingly, the Commission concluded that the alien exemption
provision indicates Congress' intent to ensure United States citizens working
for such employers protection under the Act.'6 5
The Commission also observed that Title VII does not expressly exempt
United States employers abroad from coverage even though various provi-
sions of Title VII exempt certain specified entities.' 66 In the Commission's
view, an interpretation favoring the extraterritorial application of the Act is
consistent with the congressional goal of diminishing the deleterious effects
of discrimination on the national economy.' 67 The Commission noted that
congressional concern over adverse economic effects is applicable to overseas
employment because the cumulative effect of discrimination abroad on for-
eign commerce is similar to that wrought by domestic discrimination on in-
terstate commerce.' 68 Moreover, the EEOC asserted that an interpretation
of the alien exemption provision as evidence of congressional intent to apply
159. Id.; see also supra note 45 and accompanying text.
160. The Policy Guidance, supra note 56, at 2391 n. 1; see also supra note 48 and accompa-
nying text.
161. The Policy Guidance, supra note 56, at 2392.
162. Id. The Commission stated that exemptions are construed "narrowly so as to give full
force and effect to the basic thrust of any statutory scheme." Id.
163. a d
164. Id.
165. Id. (citing Bryant v. International Schools Servs., Inc., 502 F. Supp. 472, (D.N.J.
1980), rev'don other grounds, 675 F.2d 562 (3d Cir. 1982); Love v. Pullman Co., 13 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 423 (D. Colo. 1976), aff'd on other grounds, 569 F.2d 1074 (10th Cir.
1978)).
166. Id. at 2393.
167. Id.
168. Id. The Commission argues that "discrimination taking place here and in some in-
stances discrimination taking place abroad can have a significant effect" on commerce. Id
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Title VII to covered entities abroad gives meaning to the provision and en-
sures that the broad remedial purposes of the legislation are adequately
fulfilled.' 69
2. The EEOC's Investigation of Charges Involving Extraterritorial
Discrimination
An investigation by the EEOC into a charge of discrimination occurring
overseas involves an evaluation of the potential conflicts of law, as well as a
determination of whether the investigation itself would interfere with valid
foreign policy concerns. 170 For this type of investigation, the Policy Gui-
dance advocates coordination with the Department of State. 1 7 1 Thus, en-
forcement of the extraterritorial application of Title VII is fraught with
complex policy issues involving more than simply an investigation of the
charge of employment discrimination to determine whether there is reason-
able cause to believe that the employer violated the statutory proscriptions of
the Act.
172
With these complex issues in mind, the Commission listed three factors to
consider when investigating a charge requiring application of Title VII to
extraterritorial acts of discrimination: The status of the Charging Party, the
employer, and the country involved. 17  With respect to the status of the
Charging Party, the Commission noted that Title VII applies to United
States citizens employed overseas by otherwise covered employers and, in
most cases, applies to citizens and aliens working in the United States.' 74 As
for discriminatory employment practices occurring abroad, an investigation
of the charge hinges on the status of the employer as either an American or a
foreign corporation. 75 Two relevant factors regarding employer status are:
169. Id. The Supreme Court, in Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Connell, 335 U.S. 377, 389-90
(1948), decided that in construing the extraterritorial application of a statute, the court must
arrive at an interpretation of the statute which is consistent with the legislative purposes be-
hind its enactment.
170. This section focuses on Part III of the Policy Guidance, entitled "Investigating Cases
Involving the Extraterritorial Application of Title VII and its Application to Foreign Owned
or Controlled Companies Operating in the U.S." The Policy Guidance, supra note 56, at 2396.
Further, this material is only concerned with the criteria for investigating charges involving
extraterritorial discrimination.
171. Id. Part II of the Policy Guidance discusses the limitations on applying Title VII to
U.S. companies abroad. The only pertinent limitations on the extraterritorial application of
Title VII involve international and foreign law. Id.
172. Id. The Commission states that its "decision to process a case against a particular
employer might trigger a chain of actions and inquiries that could go beyond the notion of the
traditional employee-employer situation." Id.
173. Id. at 2396.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 2397.
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(1) corporate identity or nationality; 7 6 and (2) the extent of corporate activ-
ity within the United States. 17 7 In the context of discrimination overseas,
the status of the country will be relevant only when foreign policy concerns
are raised as a defense. The possibility may exist that foreign law mandates
the discriminatory employment practice involved. In these situations, the
Commission advocates coordination with the State Department.
178
a Situations in Which Corporate Activities Will Subject the
Corporation to United States Law
Drawing on general principles of corporate law, 179 the Policy Guidance
sets forth an analysis of the jurisdictional reach of Title VII over acts of
discrimination occurring extraterritorially by both United States and foreign
corporations.' 80 The Commission asserts that liability for proscribed unfair
employment practices may be imposed upon a United States employer
outside the country only if it conducts "some further business here."'' This
"further business" requirement ensures that traditional notions of fair play
and justice are not disregarded, because an employer conducting business
within the United States is on notice that any of its employment practices
which violate Title VII might subject it to the administrative process of the
EEOC.'8 2 As for a foreign corporation, the Commission posits that the acts
of incorporating within the United States and conducting business here will
not be sufficient to subject the foreign corporation to the proscriptions of
176. Id The Commission lists six factors to be considered when determining corporate
nationality:
(a) nationality of control, i..e., nationality of the individual or company that controls
the business; (b) principal place of business, i.e., place where primary factories and
offices are located; (c) place of incorporation; (d) voting control nationality, i.e., iden-
tity of persons holding voting stock; (e) dominant shareholders' nationality; and (f)
nationality of the management, i.e., of the officers and directors.
Id
177. Id. "[I]ncorporation in the U.S. is relevant in that incorporation is itself a form of
business." Id.
178. Id. at 2399-406.
179. Id. at 2397. The Commission set forth general principles of corporate law which ap-
ply on a national level:
In U.S. corporate law there is no inherent right to conduct business as a corpora-
tion; it is a right given to persons by the state. By incorporating within a state, the
company invokes the benefits, privileges, and protections of that state's laws. How-
ever, this in turn subjects the company to those laws - by incorporating within a
state, the company becomes a "person" under, and subject to, all the state's laws and
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Title VII.18 3 The Commission will only assert its jurisdiction to investigate a
charge of overseas discrimination by a foreign corporation, incorporated in
the United States and doing further business here, when the discriminatory
act is in some way connected to the business that the corporation conducts
within the United States. 18 4 In the case of a foreign corporation, the addi-
tional requirement of substantial contact with the United States evinces an
attempt to comport with the due process notion of "minimum contacts"
with the forum state.' 5 By requiring this additional connection, the Com-
mission ensures that the traditional concerns regarding the exercise of juris-
diction over a nonresident defendant will not be subverted.
b. The Case of an American Employer and its Foreign Subsidiary
Where the Discrimination Happens Overseas
The Commission will investigate charges of overseas discrimination
brought by a United States citizen against a United States corporation when
the corporation is incorporated, and involved in further business activities,
within the United States.' 6 To illustrate situations in which jurisdiction
under Title VII applies, the Policy Guidance provides two examples. First,
the Commission will assert jurisdiction in the following situation: An em-
ployee, working for a United States corporation, is sent abroad to work for
the corporation's overseas operations; while there, the employee is subjected
to unfair employment practices.' Second, the Commission will assert ju-
risdiction if a discrimination charge is filed by a person who sought employ-
ment with a United States corporation's overseas operations and was denied
employment because the corporation decided that the person's immutable
characteristics would prevent the successful conduct of business with the
nationals of the foreign country.'8
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958);
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
186. See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
187. The Policy Guidance, supra note 56, at 2398. The text of Example 1 is as follows:
Carl works for an American company with its headquarters in Texas. His com-
pany sends him to Cairo, Egypt to run a temporary housing project for its Houston,
Texas road camp now operating in Egypt for two years. While living and working in
Egypt, Carl files a race and national origin discrimination charge against his supervi-
sor who also lives and works in Egypt. Title VII covers an American citizen working
overseas for an American employer.
Id. This situation is similar to Boureslan v. Aramco, 857 F.2d 1014 (1988), cert. granted sub
nom. EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 111 S. Ct. 40 (1990), in which the Fifth Circuit
refused to apply Title VII extraterritorially. Id. at 1018. See infra notes 204-309 and accom-
panying text for a complete discussion of the Boureslan opinion.
188. The Policy Guidance, supra note 56, at 2398. The text of Example 2 is as follows:
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The Commission asserts that a corporation will be subject to the jurisdic-
tion of the Act if the corporation, although incorporated abroad, is either a
subsidiary of a United States corporation, or, in some way, is controlled by
that corporation.189 The Commission argues that both the foreign company
owned or controlled by an American corporation, and the American corpo-
ration, are liable for acts of overseas employment discrimination against a
United States citizen if the two corporations either operate as an "integrated
enterprise" or maintain a "joint employer" relationship."9 Liability rests on
the theory that the two corporations maintain such a high degree of inte-
grated operations that, in the eyes of an aggrieved employee, the normal
perception of the parent and subsidiary as separate entities is blurred.' 91
The aggrieved employee expects that the acts of his immediate employer are
A female applied for the directorship of an American oil company's international
marketing section. The oil company has offices in Peoria; CP [Charging Party] ap-
plied for a job with R's [Respondent's] Venezualan [sic] operations. She was denied
the position because of the company's policy against hiring women for this position.
Management believes that the cultural customs and mores prevalent in Latin
America would prevent a woman from performing the job and attracting customers
while doing business there. The applicant filed a sex discrimination charge against
the American oil corporation. Jurisdiction should be asserted.
Id This scenario is identical to the situation in Fernandez v. Wynn Oil Co., 653 F.2d 1273
(9th Cir. 1981). See supra notes 100-05 and accompanying text.
189. The Policy Guidance, supra note 56, at 2398. The relevant portion of the example is
as follows:
While living in France, CP submits an application to TYZ, a foreign-incorporated
corporation controlled and wholly owned by an American parent corporation,
TELL-CON, Inc. TYZ is TELL-CON's agent in the field of polymer science. TYZ
has never recruited, interviewed, or hired a female applicant for the position of poly-
mer science engineer, despite having received hundreds of applications from qualified
American female applicants each year. TYZ automatically rejects all applications
from females because, pursuant to TELL-CON instructions, it has an unwritten pol-
icy of maintaining an all male polymer science department. A foreign company
owned or controlled by an American employer must also follow the provisions of
Title VII. Failure to do so in a situation such as this may result in liability for both
the controlling company and its foreign subsidiary.
Id. (emphasis in original).
190. Id.
191. Id at 2398-99. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in Arm-
bruster v. Quinn, 711 F.2d 1332 (6th Cir. 1983), noted, in determining whether to hold a
parent corporation liable for the acts of its subsidiary, that:
[T]he most important requirement is that there be sufficient indicia of an interrela-
tionship between the immediate corporate employer and the affiliated corporation to
justify the belief on the part of an aggrieved employee that the affiliated corporation
is jointly responsible for the acts of the immediate employer. When such a degree of
interrelatedness is present, we consider the departure from the "normal" separate
existence between entities an adequate reason to view the subsidiary's conduct as that
of both.
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attributable to the affiliated employer. 92 The Commission notes in the Pol-
icy Guidance, however, that the liability of both corporations for the acts of
the immediate employer depends upon the degree of control exercised by the
parent over the subsidiary. 193 In particular, the Commission has identified
four factors relevant to a determination of single employer status: "[t]he
degree of (1) interrelated operations, (2) common management, (3) central-
ized control of labor relations, and (4) common ownership or financial
control."1 94
c. Amenability of a Foreign Employer to Title VII Where the
Discriminatory Practice Happens Overseas
To establish liability under Title VII for an overseas foreign-owned corpo-
ration which is incorporated and doing business in the United States, the
unfair employment practice must be connected to the business conducted by
the corporation within the United States.195 Two examples illustrate situa-
tions in which the Commission would, because of the connection between
the discriminatory act and the business conducted within the United States,
pursue a remedy under Title VII for acts of discrimination perpetrated by
these companies. The first situation concerns a discriminatory act impacting
192. Armbruster, 711 F.2d at 1337.
193. The Policy Guidance, supra note 56, at 2399. The Commission states that "[t]he ulti-
mate question is whether the parent exercises a greater than usual degree of control over the
operations of the subsidiary." Id.
194. Id Armbruster v. Quinn, 711 F.2d 1332, 1337 (6th Cir. 1983). The Armbruster court
adopted this four part test from Radio Union v. Broadcast Service, 380 U.S. 255 (1965). The
NLRB originally formulated this test to determine liability under the NLRA. The Armbruster
court stated that no one factor is determinative, and that the presence of all four factors is
unnecessary. Armbruster, 711 F.2d at 1337-38.
In this section, the Commission relies heavily on Lavrov v. NCR Corp., 600 F. Supp. 923
(S.D. Ohio 1984), a case in which the district court considered the liability under Title VII of a
foreign subsidiary of an American corporation. The plaintiff in this case was employed by
NCR, a United States corporation. Id. at 924. She sought a transfer to NCR GmbH, a Ger-
man corporation and wholly owned subsidiary of NCR, located in Augsburg, West Germany.
Id. When her repeated requests for transfer were denied, the plaintiff brought charges against
both companies under Title VII, relying on the joint employer theory. Id. at 925. The court,
in applying the four part test, refused to grant summary judgment to the defendants on this
issue, finding that a genuine issue of fact existed as to whether the two entities could be held
liable under the joint employer theory. Id. at 928. Cf Mas Marques v. Digital Equip. Corp.,
637 F.2d 24 (1st Cir. 1980) (Title VII plaintiff failed to satisfy the four part NLRB test regard-
ing the single employer liability of the defendant corporation and its German subsidiary for the
latter's allegedly discriminatory hiring practices); see also Williams v. Evangelical Retirement
Homes, 594 F.2d 701, 703 (8th Cir. 1979); Baker v. Stuart Broadcasting Co., 560 F.2d 389,
392 (8th Cir. 1977) (applying NLRB test); Linskey v. Heidelberg Eastern, Inc., 470 F. Supp.
1181, 1183-84 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) (same); EEOC v. Upjohn Corp., 445 F. Supp. 635, 638 (N.D.
Ga. 1977) (same).
195. The Policy Guidance, supra note 56, at 2399.
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upon a term or condition of employment dealing directly with employment
in the United States: For example, when an employer discriminatorily de-
nies a promotion to an employee which would entail transferring the em-
ployee to the United States, the Commission would pursue a remedy under
Title VII.'96 In the Policy Guidance, the Commission argues that in this
situation, Title VII applies extraterritorially because of the employer's incor-
poration within the United States, the employer's conduct of business within
the jurisdiction, and the close connection between the alleged discriminatory
act and the forum. 197
A second situation in which the Commission will assert jurisdiction arises
when the discriminatory employment practice concerns an aspect of the em-
ployee's duties that involves contact with the United States. The example
offered by the Commission concerns an employer who discriminatorily dis-
charges an employee based on a determination that the employee's perform-
ance is deficient in terms of the filling of orders received from the United
States for the employer's product.198 Because the employee claims that the
employer based the unfavorable performance rating on racial considerations,
and that the adverse rating is connected to the corporation's United States
business, the Commission argues in the Policy Guidance that Title VII is
applicable.' 99
196. Id. The text of Example 1 is as follows:
X is a foreign company incorporated in Kansas; X employs Americans to sell its
products there. John Doe, an American citizen and Junior Supervisor works for X in
Paris, France where he receives and fills sales orders from the Kansas office. He
applies to the headquarters office in Paris for a Senior Supervisor's position that
would have allowed him to move back to his home state of Kansas. After he is
rejected, he files a charge of discrimination against X. He alleges that he was not
promoted to the Senior Supervisory position because he is an Asian. There is Title
VII coverage.
Id.
197. "[H]ad he been chosen for the position, he would have been promoted to a position
that would have allowed him to relocate to [State X]." Id.
198. Id. The text of the example follows:
CP, an American citizen, was living and working in Mexico for a Mexican corpo-
ration, which was incorporated in the United States; this company has a catalog
service at three locations in Mobile, Alabama. Every year a Quality Control Inspec-
tor comes from one of the Mexican company's Alabama offices to do an on-site in-
spection of the Mexican plants. CP is fired because of unfavorable and racially-
related remarks made by the White Inspector at the job site. These remarks con-
cerned, among other things, his performance in filling orders placed in the U.S. CP
claims that the Inspector's comments were racially motivated and that the American
Inspector never says anything favorable about Blacks because he does not like them.
There is Title VII coverage.
Id.
199. Id. at 2399-403. The Commission offers a series of questions which assist in determin-
ing whether the commercial activities of the foreign corporation within the United States are
1990] 1135
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The final analysis of the possible situations in which Title VII applies to
extraterritorial acts of discrimination focuses on foreign corporations not in-
corporated within the United States.2"° The Commission takes the position
that, in this situation, a foreign owned and incorporated employer is not
covered by Title VII because an accepted basis for exercising jurisdiction
does not exist.2"1 The examples offered by the Commission to illustrate this
point contemplate corporations which, in all respects, represent foreign enti-
ties independent of any influence or control by United States corpora-
tions.2"2 Application of Title VII in these situations would be unwarranted,
even if the corporation conducts business within the United States.2"3
IV. BOURESLAN V. ARAMco" THE POLICY GUIDANCE UNHEEDED
A. Background
Within weeks of the issuance of the Policy Guidance, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in Boureslan v. Aramco,2 °4 rejected
the principles advocated by the EEOC regarding the extraterritorial applica-
tion of Title VII. Contrary to the opinions of the federal district courts
which have supported the extraterritorial application of Title VII, the
Boureslan court decision represents the first time a circuit court of appeals
refused to extend the Act's proscriptions overseas. Because the United
States Supreme Court has not decided the extraterritorial reach of Title VII,
and because this decision constitutes the most comprehensive analysis of the
issue to date, the case merits extensive examination.20 5
connected to the discriminatory employment practice. These questions concern: (1) The loca-
tion of the office in which the violation occured; (2) the state of incorporation; (3) the nature of
the company (for example, a subsidiary of a U.S. corporation); (4) whether a joint employer
relationship exists between the employer and an American corporation; (5) if the violation
involves recruiting or hiring, where and how did the recruiting occur; (6) if the violation in-
volves terms or conditions of employment, the location of employee's position and the "con-
nection between the challenged action and the employer's business with the United States";
and (7) whether the employer's operations, agents or facilities are located within the U.S. Id.
200. Id. at 2399-404.
201. Id. Incorporation within a state is an accepted basis for exercising jurisdiction.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. 857 F.2d 1014, cert. granted sub non. EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 11 S. Ct.
40 (1990).
205. A full panel of the Fifth Circuit affirmed the panel majority opinion, 892 F.2d 1271
(1990) (nine judges affirming, five dissenting). The en banc opinion, both majority and dissent,
substantially followed the reasoning of the previous panel opinion, and, therefore, will not be
reviewed in this article.
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In Boureslan, a naturalized citizen of the United States, Ali Boureslan, 2°6
worked as an engineer with Aramco Services Company (ASC)20 7 in Hous-
ton, Texas. Soon after beginning employment with ASC, Boureslan trans-
ferred to Arabian American Oil Company (Aramco), ASC's parent
corporation in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia.2°" Within a few months after his
transfer, Boureslan experienced problems with his supervisor which,
Boureslan alleged, resulted from racial, religious, and ethnic harassment
aimed at his Lebanese national origin.2 °9 Aramco later terminated
Boureslan's employment.21 °
After seeking administrative relief from the EEOC,21 Boureslan filed suit
against ASC and Aramco in the United States District Court for the South-
em District of Texas.212 Boureslan sought relief under Title VII as well as
state law for the alleged discriminatory treatment suffered while in
Dhahran. 213 Both ASC and Aramco sought dismissal of the case.214 ASC
questioned the propriety of its inclusion as a defendant,2 5 and Aramco ar-
gued that Title VII should not be applied extraterritorially. 21 6 Boureslan
maintained that congressional intent to extend the protections of Title VII to
United States citizens working for American companies abroad is clear and
217express. 1 Boureslan stressed that the negative inference implicit in the
alien exemption provision sufficiently expressed a congressional intent to
overcome the presumption against extraterritorial application of domestic
legislation.2 8 He argued that the provision is meaningless unless Title VII
applies extraterritorially.21 9 Without this provision, Boureslan contended,
Title VII protects neither United States citizens nor aliens employed by
United States companies abroad.220 Boureslan averred that, by including
the alien exemption provision, Congress intended to protect United States
206. Id. at 1016.
207. ASC is incorporated in Delaware and operates principally in Houston, Texas. Id.
208. Id. Aramco is incorporated in the United States and has its principal place of business







215. Id. ASC argued that it could not be liable because Boureslan transferred to Aramco,
thus terminating the employment relationship once existing between ASC and Boureslan and
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citizens employed abroad.22 ' Because the majority in Boureslan determined
that Title VII does not apply to American companies operating overseas and
dismissed the case,222 Boureslan and the EEOC as party intervenor filed a
petition with the Fifth Circuit for a rehearing en banc. 223
B. The Majority Opinion: A Step Backward for Civil Rights
In its statutory analysis of the extraterritorial reach of Title VII, the
Boureslan majority considered the rules governing Congress' intent to ex-
tend the territorial reach of domestic legislation beyond the borders of the
United States. 224 Placing primary reliance on Supreme Court precedent, 225
the court concluded that a presumption exists against the extraterritorial
application of United States laws.226 Further, the court stated that this pre-
sumption against extraterritorial application is effectively rebutted only by
"a clear congressional expression of intent to the contrary., 227
The majority discounted Boureslan's reliance on the express language of
the alien exemption provision to overcome the presumption against extrater-
ritoriality. The court summarily rejected Boureslan's argument that the pro-
vision serves no purpose unlesi upheld as evidence of congressional support
221. Id.
222. Id. at 1021.
223. Boureslan v. Aramco, 863 F.2d 8 (1988), aff'd on reh'g, 892 F.2d 1271 (5th Cir.
1990).
224. Boureslan, 857 F.2d at 1016-17.
225. See Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281 (1949).
226. Boureslan, 857 F.2d at 1017. In Foley Bros., the Court considered the application of a
federal law which prohibited more than an eight hour work day without the payment of over-
time for work performed overseas pursuant to a contract between a private contractor and the
federal government. The Court stated that:
"The canon on construction which teaches that legislation of Congress, unless a con-
trary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the
United States, is a valid approach whereby unexpressed congressional intent may be
ascertained. It is based on the assumption that Congress is primarily concerned with
domestic conditions. We find nothing in the Act itself, as amended, nor in the legis-
lative history, which would lead to the belief that Congress entertained any intention
other than the normal one in this case."
Id. (quoting Foley Bros, 336 U.S. at 285) (citation omitted); see also McCulloch v. Sociedad
Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 21-22 (1963) (Court requires clear congres-
sional intent to construe legislation beyond domestic jurisdiction).
227. Boureslan, 857 F.2d at 1017 (citing Pfeiffer v. Wm. Wrigley, Jr. Co., 755 F.2d 554
(7th Cir. 1985) (rejecting extraterritorial application of ADEA without affirmative congres-
sional intent); Cleary v. United States Lines, Inc., 728 F.2d 607 (3d Cir. 1984) (same); United
States v. Mitchell, 553 F.2d 996 (5th Cir. 1977) (rejecting extraterritorial application of the
Marine Mammal Protection Act)). The court then cited a number of cases which have denied
extraterritorial application of the Railway Labor Act as support for its position that absent a
clear expression of contrary congressional intent, the presumption against extraterritoriality is
not rebutted. Id at 1017.
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for extraterritoriality.22 In a forceful retort, the court stated that it was not
faced with the choice of either accepting Boureslan's interpretation of the
provision or depriving the provision of any purpose.22 9 Rather, the majority
stated that the purpose of the alien exemption provision is to protect aliens
employed within the United States.2 3' The majority buttressed this position
by relying on the Supreme Court's interpretation of the alien exemption pro-
vision in Espinoza v. Farah Manufacturing Co. as an expression of congres-
sional intent to protect aliens employed within the United States from acts of
discrimination.
2 31
Finding that the express language of the Act did not contain any refer-
ences or expressions which would overcome the presumption against extra-
territoriality, the court examined the legislative history of the Act for an
expressed legislative intent to the contrary. 232 The court also briefly ad-
dressed three specific references to the Act's legislative history contained in
an amicus curiae brief submitted by the EEOC on behalf of Boureslan:
233
First, the power of Congress to regulate foreign commerce as a basis for the
exercise of jurisdiction to prescribe extraterritorial acts of discrimination; 234
second, the purpose of ensuring equal protection and the full enjoyment of
Constitutional rights by all; 235 and third, the economic barrier to the
achievement of these constitutionally guaranteed rights, perpetuated by dis-
crimination in employment opportunities. 236 The EEOC urged that these
statements, along with the conspicuous omission of any express language
denying extraterritorial application, advance an interpretation of the Act
which permits extraterritorial application.237
Although noting that an opinion of the EEOC with respect to Title VII is
generally entitled to great deference, the court dismissed these passing refer-
ences to the legislative history as "general policy statements," insufficient to
228. Boureslan, 857 F.2d at 1018.
229. Id.
230. Id
231. Id. (citing Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 95 (1973)).
232. Boureslan, 857 F.2d at 1018. The court cautioned that any examination of legislative
history to determine legislative intent should proceed cautiously because "[Il]egislative history
is relegated to a secondary source behind the language of the statute." Id. (citing United States
v. Smith, 795 F.2d 841 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1032 (1987)).
233. Id. at 1019; see also supra notes 43-50 and accompanying text.
234. Boureslan, 857 F.2d at 1019 (quoting House Report on Civil Rights Acts of 1964,
H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963), reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD-
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successfully rebut the presumption against extraterritoriality. 2 5 The court
determined that Boureslan and the EEOC did not meet its test of a "clear"
expression of contrary intent by introducing what the court deemed state-
ments as equivocal as the statutory language itself.239 The court justified its
conclusion by pointing to a number of references in the legislative history
which support territorial limitations on the jurisdiction of Title VII. 24° The
court noted that the statutory definition of "state" in Title VII focuses on
areas within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States and does not
mention foreign countries.24 1 Also, the court referenced various statements
in the legislative history which indicate that, at the time of enactment, Con-
gress primarily concerned itself with domestic problems of discrimination.2 42
The court admitted that, although similarly vague and inconclusive, the per-
suasive value of these references was equivalent to those statements offered
by the EEOC.2
4 3
The court similarly dismissed one final reference to the legislative history
offered by the EEOC as too vague to overcome the presumption against ex-
traterritoriality. 244 The EEOC asserted that a statement made during the
hearings on an early House version of the bill elucidated the purpose behind
the alien exemption provision as an attempt to eliminate the possible con-
flicts of law which might arise from the extraterritorial application of Title
VII. 24s The EEOC referenced this portion of the legislative history to
demonstrate conclusive support for the negative implication that the alien
exemption provision indicates a congressional intent to protect Americans
employed abroad by American employers. 2 In the court's opinion, how-




241. Id.; see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(i) (1982).
242. Boureslan, 857 F.2d at 1019 (citing 110 CONG. REc. 6550 (1964) (statements of Sen.
Hubert Humphrey concerning problems among the various states with employment discrimi-
nation); 110 CONG. REC. 14301 (1964) (statements of Sen. Richard Russell comparing "the
effect of Title VII on southern states versus other states"); 110 CoNG. REc. 1521 (1964) (state-
ments of Rep. Emanuel Celler regarding deferral to state fair employment legislation)).
The court also noted that Congress deleted various statements regarding "foreign com-
merce" and "foreign nations" from early drafts of the House bill, as evidenced by an annotated
copy of the bill placed into the Congressional record by Senator Dirksen. Id. at 1020 & n.3
(citing 110 CONG. REc. 12811-17 (1964)).
243. Id. at 1020.
244. Id.
245. Id. (citing Civil Rights: Hearings on H.R. 7152, as amended by Subcommittee No. 5
before the House Committee on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 2303 (1963)); see also supra
note 55 and accompanying text.
246. Boureslan, 857 F.2d at 1020.
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come the presumption against extraterritorial application of domestic
legislation.247 Balancing its own requirement of a clear expression of con-
gressional intent against Boureslan and the EEOC's argument that the nega-
tive inference of the alien exemption provision is such a clear expression, the
court tipped the scale in favor of requiring an affirmative expression of intent
to overcome the presumption against extraterritorial application of domestic
legislation.2 41
Concluding that Boureslan, and the EEOC as amicus, had failed to
demonstrate a clear expression of congressional intent to protect Americans
employed abroad, the court addressed the plaintiff's final arguments regard-
ing the policy reasons supporting his interpretation of Title VII.249 These
arguments focused on the potential for injustice implicit in the court's re-
fusal to apply Title VII to acts of discrimination occurring abroad.250
Although acknowledging the significance of the policy considerations ex-
pressed by Boureslan and the EEOC, the court determined that these con-
cerns could not override the powerful policy arguments against the
extraterritorial application of the Act.251 The court asserted that the legisla-
ture, and not the courtroom, was the proper forum for striking a balance
between these competing interests.2" 2
C. The Dissent: An Alternative Framework for Analyzing the Issue of
Extraterritorial Application of United States Laws
1. "The Presumption Against Extraterritoriality"
In a well reasoned dissent, Judge King characterized the majority opinion
as a misapplication of the concepts of statutory construction used to deter-
mine the level of congressional intent necessary to overcome the presump-
tion against extraterritoriality. 2" Specifically, Judge King took issue with
the majority's "misguided" determination that only an express congressional
247. Id.
248. Id. The Court stated that the "EEOC still must argue a negative inference... that
Congress spoke by not speaking. This silence will not reverse the presumption that this legisla-
tion applies only to employees employed in the United States." Id.
249. Id.
250. Id. Boureslan and the EEOC argued that the inequitable result of allowing a plaintiff
to recover for an unfair employment practice occurring within the United States, while deny-
ing another United States citizen redress for a similar act of discrimination by his United
States employer overseas, would be highly deleterious to the remedial purposes of the Act.
251. Id. The only countervailing policy reasons mentioned by the court, which counselled
against extraterritorial application of Title VII, were that the religious and social customs of
foreign nations may conflict with those prevalent in the United States, complicating the ability
of American employers abroad to comply with Title VII fair employment standards. Id.
252. Id. at 1020-21.
253. Id. at 1021-22 (King, J., dissenting).
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evocation of intent to apply Title VII extraterritorially is sufficient to over-
come the threshold presumption against extraterritorial application of do-
mestic legislation.254
Relying on the same principles of statutory construction employed by the
majority, 255 Judge King agreed with the majority's "clear expression" re-
quirement, but argued that "clear" does not necessarily mean explicit.256
Rather, the dissent asserted that, under the general rules of statutory con-
struction, where the statutory language is vague, the application of a statute
to a given set of facts depends upon a determination of the purpose behind
the legislation as found within the legislative history.257
Both the rule regarding the construction of vague statutory language and
the rule regarding the presumption against extraterritoriality are applicable
when the territorial scope of a statute is less than clear from the statutory
language.258 Drawing on these rules of statutory construction, Judge King
noted that in order to resolve the unclear scope, or in this case the uncertain
jurisdictional reach of a statute, a court must determine the unexpressed
congressional intent behind the statute.2 59 To determine the scope of this
intent, Judge King asserted that the court must be informed by the legisla-
tive history of the statute, particularly the purposes behind the legislation.2' °
254. Id at 1022.
255. Id.; see supra notes 224-27 and accompanying text.
256. Boureslan, 857 F.2d at 1022 & n.3, 4 (King, J., dissenting). Here, Judge King noted
that the presumption against extraterritoriality, which was formulated in United States v.
Mitchell and was binding on the court, was based on two prior cases, neither of which them-
selves required a "clear" expression of "contrary intent." United States v. Mitchell, 553 F.2d
996, 1002 (5th Cir. 1977) (citing Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 285 (1952) and
Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949)). In Mitchell, however, the Fifth Circuit
held that "[t]o overcome the presumption and to apply the statute beyond the territory of the
United States, the Government must show a clear expression of congression intent." Mitchell,
553 F.2d at 1002 (emphasis added). Notwithstanding this binding precedent, Judge King ar-
gued that "'clear' does not mean 'express,' and there is no reason why a 'clear' intent to apply
a statute extraterritorially may not be determined with reference to the rules of statutory con-
struction, informed by legislative history." Boureslan, 857 F.2d at 1022 (King, J., dissenting).
257. Boureslan, 857 F.2d at 1022 (King, J., dissenting); see also United States v. James, 478
U.S. 597 (1986) (legislative history can be a legitimate guide to a statutory purpose obscured
by ambiguity); Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886 (1984) (the courts will look first to the statutory
language and then to the legislative history if the statutory language is unclear); Tidewater Oil
Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 151, 157 (1972) ("while the clear meaning of statutory language
is not to be ignored, 'words are inexact tools at best,' and hence it is essential that we place the
words of a statute in their proper context by resort to the legislative history." (citation omit-
ted) (quoting Harrison v. Northern Trust Co., 317 U.S. 476, 479 (1943)).
258. Boureslan, 857 F.2d at 1022 (King, J., dissenting); see also supra note 226 and accom-
panying text.
259. Boureslan, 857 F.2d at 1022 (King, J., dissenting); see also Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo,
336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949).
260. Boureslan, 857 F.2d at 1022 (King, J., dissenting).
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The central inquiry, as noted by Judge King, is not whether this examination
reveals an affirmative, a clear, or an unexpressed intention. Rather, the pur-
pose behind the statute should supply the dispositive evidence of the in-
tended statutory scope: the scope given to the statute should correlate to the
statutory purpose.26 1 If the articulated purpose of the legislation is broad,
the intended reach of the statute should be given similar effect.262
Regarding the presumption against extraterritoriality, Judge King argued
that the majority misconstrued the purpose behind the presumption 263 by
requiring an extremely burdensome showing of congressional intent to over-
come the presumption.2 4 Judge King argued that the majority believed the
presumption should operate as a method of evaluating "potential conflicts of
jurisdiction. ' 265 The explicit showing of congressional intent reflected the
majority's belief that, where the policy considerations involved in applying a
statute overseas are potentially volatile, a heightened showing of congres-
sional intent would be necessary to overcome the presumption.26 6 Judge
King asserted that a threshold showing of congressional intent to overcome
the presumption against extraterritorial application of domestic laws would
have the practical effect of eliminating any conflicts of law.267 Thus, Judge
King stated that the court will resolve any conflicts of law only after the
threshold showing is established.26 8
Judge King, however, did not completely disparage the majority's theory
that when the implications of applying a statute extraterritorially are so
great, a more explicit showing of congressional intent is necessary to over-
261. See id.
262. Id.; see Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 286-87 (1952). The Lanham Act,
at issue in Steele, provides a trademark registrant with a civil cause of action against "[a]ny
person who shall, in commerce .... use... [a] colorable imitation of any registered mark in
connection with the sale" or distribution of goods. Id. at 284, n.8 (quoting 15 U.S.C.
§ 11 14(l)(a)). "'Commerce' is defined as 'all commerce which may lawfully be regulated by
Congress.'" Id. at 284 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1127). The Court held that the broad purposes of
the Lanham Act create a sufficient indication that Congress intended the Act to reach the
extraterritorial conduct of U.S. nationals. Steele, 344 U.S. at 286-87.
263. Boureslan, 857 F.2d at 1022 (King, J., dissenting).
264. Id.
265. Id. (footnote omitted).
266. Id. at 1022-23. Here, Judge King argued that the majority, through its evaluation of
the policy implications in applying Title VII extraterritorially, was making policy, a function
best left for the legislature. Id. at 1023. As Judge King noted, the purposes behind the alien
exemption provision evince a congressional intent to avoid the conflicts of law which arise
when applying Title VII to citizens of foreign countries. Id. Judge King found it logical to
believe that, by this statement, Congress concluded no such corresponding obstacles would be
present in exercising jurisdiction abroad over acts of discrimination perpetrated by United
States corporations against their United States employees. Id.
267. Id. at 1022 n.5.
268. Id.
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come the presumption.269 Judge King stated that where the extraterritorial
application of a statute violates principles of international law, a court will
apply the statute extraterritorially only if Congress affirmatively expressed
its intention to breach that principle.270 Nevertheless, Judge King viewed
the presumption against extraterritoriality as a consideration separate and
distinct from the presumption against violating public international law. 271
Specifically, Judge King concluded that if the presumption against extrater-
ritoriality is met by the introduction of a clear expression of congressional
intent to apply the statute beyond the borders of the United States, then the
statute will be given that effect unless doing so would violate international
law. 272
2. The Dissent's Alternative Framework for Evaluating the
Extraterritorial Application of Title VII
Recognizing the majority's misguided analysis of whether Title VII ap-plies extraterritorially, Judge King proposed an alternative framework for
2731i
resolution of this issue. Judge King's framework incorporated the "rea-
sonableness" test of the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of
the United States section 403 (Restatement) which provides that, as a matter
of international law, a state may exercise its jurisdicition beyond its borders
only if doing so would be reasonable. 274 From an analytical standpoint,
269. Id. at 1023.
270. Id. The courts will not presume that Congress intended to violate international law.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 114,
115 comment a (1987) ("It is generally assumed that Congress does not intend to repudiate an
international obligation of the United States by nullifying a rule of international law or an
international agreement as domestic law .... ). Therefore, an act of Congress will not be
presumed to conflict with principles of international law unless Congress has expressly af-
firmed that intent. Boureslan, 857 F.2d at 1023 (King, J., dissenting) (citing Weinberger v.
Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 32 (1982); McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras,
372 U.S. 10, 20-21 (1963); Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118
(1804)).
271. Boureslan, 857 F.2d at 1023 (King, J., dissenting). Judge King noted the majority's
confusion of the two separate presumptions, stating that:
By requiring a more explicit showing of congressional intent to apply Title VII
extraterritorially - without discussing whether extraterritorial application of Title
VII would violate international law - the majority has implicitly conflated the two
standards and has therefore defeated congressional intent without sufficient
justification.
Id. at 1023-24.
272. Id. at 1023.
273. Id. at 1024.
274. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 403(1)). Restatement section 402 notes that jurisdiction to prescribe legis-
lation is generally based on principles of territoriality or nationality. RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
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Judge King's alternative framework involved a two-step inquiry.27 First,
the court must ascertain whether the extraterritorial application of Title VII
is unreasonable under international law.2 76 If such application is unreasona-
ble, the court should not apply Title VII extraterritorially unless Congress
affirmatively required such application.27 7 On the other hand, Judge King
argued that if the application of Title VII beyond our borders is reasonable,
only a threshold showing of congressional intent to support the exercise of
extraterritorial jurisdiction is necessary.278
To properly assess the first prong of this analysis, whether extraterritorial
application of Title VII abroad would be unreasonable, Judge King relied on
the factors enumerated in Restatement section 403.279 The first factor enun-
ciated by the Restatement is the effect of the regulated activity on the United
OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 402 comment a. § 402 pro-
vides that:
[A] state has jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to
(1) (a) conduct that, wholly or in substantial part, takes place within its territory;
(b) the status of persons, or interests in things, present within its territory;
(c) conduct outside its territory that has or is intended to have substantial
effect within its territory;
(2) the activities, interests, status, or relations of its nationals outside as well as
within its territory; and
(3) certain conduct outside its territory by persons not its nationals that is directed
against the security of the state or against a limited class of other state interests.
Id
Because exercises of jurisdiction are normally based on territoriality, nationality being the
exceptional basis, situations will sometimes arise when both the state of territoriality and the
state of nationality, where they differ, will attempt to exercise jurisdiction. In such a situation,
if a potential or actual conflict exists, the Restatement advocates resort to an "evaluation of the
competing interests by a standard of reasonableness, as set forth in § 403 (3)." RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 402 comment b.
275. Boureslan, 857 F.2d at 1024 (King, J., dissenting).
276. Id
277. This is consistent with the principle that Congress does not intend to violate interna-
tional law unless such an intent is affirmatively expressed. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 114.
278. Boureslan, 857 F.2d at 1024 (King, J., dissenting). Judge King found support for this
two-pronged approach from the language in Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 285-86
(1952): "[T]he United States is not debarred by any rule of international law from governing
the conduct of its own citizens upon the high seas or even in foreign countries when the rights
of other nations or their nationals are not infringed." As Judge King noted, the "reasonable-
ness" test of the RESTATEMENT offers a method of determining "whether foreign rights or
interests would be infringed such that extraterritorial application of a statute would be inappli-
cable." Boureslan, 857 F.2d at 1024 n.9 (King, J., dissenting).
279. Boureslan, 857 F.2d at 1025 (King, J., dissenting). The relevant factors necessary to
determine whether an exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction would be reasonable are:
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States.2"' Judge King determined that the aggregation of the economic ef-
fects of discrimination in the United States, particularly in the context of
international employment, indicates that application of Title VII to acts of
employment discrimination abroad would be reasonable.2 ' Judge King
noted that these effects on commerce supported Congress' exercise of the
commerce power to reach acts of discrimination in the private sector.28 2 Ac-
cording to Judge King, there is no reason to distinguish between the effects
on the economy from acts of discrimination occurring within the United
States and similar acts of discrimination occurring abroad.283 To make such
a distinction, Judge King asserted, establishes an inequity in the enforcement
(a) [The link of the activity to the territory of the regulating state, i.e., the extent
to which the activity takes place within the territory, or has substantial, direct, and
foreseeable effect upon or in the territory;
(b) the connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic activity, between
the regulating state and the person principally responsible for the activity to be regu-
lated, or between that state and those whom the regulation is designed to protect;
(c) the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of regulation to
the regulating state, the extent to which other states regulate such activities, and the
degree to which the desirability of such regulation is generally accepted;
(d) the existence of justified expectations that might be protected or hurt by the
regulation;
(e) the importance of the regulation to the international political, legal, or eco-
nomic system;
(f) the extent to which the regulation is consistent with the traditions of the inter-
national system;
(g) the extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating the activ-
ity; and
(h) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by another state.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 403(2) (1987). All of these factors should be considered, but only where appropriate. Id.
280. Id. § 403(2)(a).
281. Boureslan, 857 F.2d at 1027 (King, J., dissenting). Judge King noted that "Congress
and the courts have long recognized that apart from the personal injuries of discrimination, the
cumulative effects of discrimination are pervasive." Id.; see Note, supra note 2, at 1288. The
student author noted that:
[M]any companies frequently advertise opportunities for foreign employment, accept
applications, screen and interview applicants, and ultimately hire individuals within
the territorial United States for foreign employment. Similarly, because foreign ser-
vice may be a prerequisite to promotion within the hierarchy of American multina-
tional enterprises, allowing companies to discriminate on the basis of race, religion,
sex, or national origin in the assignment of employees abroad will often lead to dis-
criminatory promotional practices at home.
Id. at 1295-96 (footnotes omitted).
282. Boureslan, 857 F.2d at 1026 (King, J., dissenting); see Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v.
United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (upholding Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as
applied to a place of public accommodation serving interstate travelers); Katzenbach v. Mc-
Clung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (upholding Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as exercise of
Congress' power under the Commerce Clause).
283. Boureslan, 857 F.2d at 1027 (King, J., dissenting).
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of the guarantees of equal employment opportunity, thus causing an anoma-
lous result when evaluated in light of the remedial purposes of Title VII.2
Moreover, citing the EEOC's observation that in multinational corporations
the future of an employee's career is often determined by his acceptance of
or promotion to a position in the corporate foreign office,2" 5 Judge King
argued that, without the protections of Title VII during their foreign assign-
ment, the future advancement of employees of such corporations, particu-
larly women and minorities, in the corporation's United States offices might
be severely limited.286 Therefore, the requisite "effect" on the United States
of any discriminatory employment practices occurring abroad renders appli-
cation of Title VII to such situations reasonable.
Judge King also considered another factor from Restatement section 403,
the protection of the justified expectations of those who would be affected by
the extraterritorial application of the legislation.28 7 Judge King determined
that United States citizens reasonably expect access to judicial recourse for
acts of discrimination occurring during their assignment to a foreign post
with their United States employer.288 Similarly, Judge King further demon-
strating the reasonableness of applying Title VII abroad by noting that the
parties to be regulated and benefitted by the extraterritorial application of
Title VII are United States nationals, and not nationals of a foreign coun-
try.28 9 In assessing the reasonableness of applying a statute extraterritori-
ally, the Restatement section 403 requires that both the entity regulated by
the statute and the class of persons for whose benefit the legislature enacted
the statute have sufficient contact with the regulating forum to satisfy tradi-
tional requirements for exercising jurisdiction.2"
284. Id. Judge King noted that although the Civil Rights Act was based upon the power of
Congress to regulate commerce as determined by the cumulative adverse economic effects of
discrimination, the main purpose of Congress was to grant equal rights to all persons within
the scope of the fourteenth amendment: "[The Civil Rights Act of 1964] was intended not
only to remedy domestic economic ills, but to protect individuals from 'the injustices and
humiliations' of discrimination." Id. at 1026 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st
Sess. 2018 (1963)); see Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 284.
285. Boureslan, 857 F.2d at 1027 (King, J., dissenting).
286. Ii
287. Id.; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 403(2)(d).
288. Boureslan, 857 F.2d at 1027 (King, J., dissenting).
289. Id.; see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 403(2)(b).
290. Boureslan, 857 F.2d at n. 17 (King, J., dissenting) ("Regulating the activities of busi-
nesses incorporated within a state is one of the oldest and most established examples of pre-
scriptive jurisdiction.") (quoting Laker Airways, Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731
F.2d 909, 926 (D.C. Cir. 1984)). As for the factors enumerated in RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 403(2)(c), (e) & (f), see supra note
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Based on this analysis of the Restatement section 403 criteria, Judge King
concluded that the extraterritorial application of Title VII is reasonable un-
less such application offends the interests of sovereign nations. 9' The dis-
sent asserted that the extraterritorial application of Title VII not only
furthers strong United States interests, but also complies with articulated
international concerns regarding the elimination of all forms of discrimina-
tion. 92 Judge King dismissed the majority's argument that the exercise of
jurisdiction over United States corporations abroad may conflict with con-
current attempts by the host nation to regulate the same activities."' The
mere fact that concurrent jurisdiction might exist, Judge King asserted, does
not render the exercise of Title VII jurisdiction unreasonable.294 Judge King
argued that the likelihood of arousing international tensions when applying
Title VII to acts of discrimination within a foreign country would be re-
279, Judge King noted that one of the underlying purposes of Title VII was to ameliorate the
unfavorable international perceptions of our domestic racial situation at a time when our own
neglect at remedying the effects of domestic discrimination undermined our push for human
rights abroad. Boureslan, 857 F.2d at 1027-28 (King, J., dissenting) (quoting H.R. REP. No.
1370, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 2156 (1962)). Therefore, this strong national commitment to the
elimination of employment discrimination, and to the stabilization of labor relations in general,
demonstrates that the character and importance of the regulated activity to the U.S. justifies
applying Title VII extraterritorially. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 403(2)(c). Moreover, "[s]ince Title VII expands on anti-
discrimination principles that have been the subject of international concern, there can be no
doubt that the desirability of the regulation is generally accepted, and that the regulation is
important to the international community and consistent with the traditions of the interna-
tional system." Id. § 403(2)(c), (e) & (f); Boureslan, 857 F.2d at 1028 (King, J., dissenting).
291. Boureslan, 857 F.2d at 1028 (King, J., dissenting). This part of Judge King's argu-
ment addressed RESTATEMENT § 403(2) factors (g)("the extent to which another state may
have an interest in regulating the activity") and (h)("the likelihood of conflict with regulation
by another state"). RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 403(2). Judge King sought to rebut Aramco's arguments that application
of Title VII extraterritorially would offend concepts of sovereignty because "labor laws are of
particularly local concern," and would "produce inevitable conflicts of law." Boureslan, 857
F.2d at 1028 (King, J., dissenting).
292. Boureslan, 857 F.2d at 1028 (King, J., dissenting); see, e.g., Note, supra note 2, at 1298
nn.66-69.
293. Boureslan, 857 F.2d at 1028 (King, J., dissenting). Aramco argued that the reasona-
bleness inquiry should be used to prevent an exercise of jurisdiction over U.S. companies when
the host nation would seek to exercise concurrent jurisdiction. Judge King noted that such a
scheme had the potential for creating a "jurisdictional vacuum," the extent to which foreign
countries might attempt to regulate the employment relationship between U.S. citizens and
their U.S. employers within their country is highly speculative. Id. Moreover, the availability
of the judicial and administrative machinery of those countries to aggrieved U.S. citizens seek-
ing relief for discriminatory employment practices is unknown. Id. Judge King further stated
that the courts of a foreign nation might evaluate the Restatement factors in such a manner as
to preclude their own exercise of jurisdiction in such situations. Id. at 1028-29.
294. Id. at 1028.
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duced because United States courts would seek to adjudicate claims involv-
ing their own nationals and not those of the foreign nation.295
Judge King also analyzed the rationales underlying other labor laws that
have been held not to apply extraterritorially, and determined that those
rationales do not impinge upon the reasonableness of applying Title VII
abroad.296 As primary support for her assertion that Title VII applies extra-
territorially, Judge King specifically relied on the reasoning behind the
Supreme Court's refusal to apply the eight hour work day297 extraterritori-
ally to violations of the act by American employers in Foley Bros. v. Fi-
lardo.29s In Foley Bros., the broad scope of the law troubled the Supreme
Court because it contained no provision that distinguished between aliens
and United States citizens working abroad. 299 The possibility existed, there-
fore, that extending extraterritorial application of the law to United States
citizens abroad might allow foreign citizens to challenge an employer's viola-
tion of the law, thereby intruding into the labor relations of a foreign coun-
try.3" Because the Court determined that extraterritorial application of the
law would affect both citizens and aliens abroad, and because such an exer-
cise of jurisdiction over foreign nationals would impinge upon the sover-
eignty of that nation, such an exercise of jurisdiction would be
unreasonable.3° '
As the Boureslan dissent noted, however, Title VII contains an alien ex-
emption provision that expressly distinguishes between aliens and United
States citizens employed abroad.3 2 The alien exemption provision, there-
fore, remedies the deficiency of other labor laws which lack similar statutory
295. Id at 1029 (citing Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597, 612
(9th Cir. 1976) ("applying American laws to American citizens raises fewer problems than
application to foreigners.")).
296. Id
297. Eight Hour Work Law, 40 U.S.C. §§ 324, 325(a), repealed by the Work Hours and
Safety Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-581, §§ 102, 104, 203, 76 Stat. 357-58, 360 (codified at 40
U.S.C. §§ 328(a), 330 (1988)).
298. 336 U.S. 281 (1949).
299. Id. at 286.
300. Boureslan, 857 F.2d at 1029 (King, J., dissenting) (quoting Foley Bros., 336 U.S. at
286.)
301. Id; Foley Bros., 336 U.S. at 286. Judge King then discussed other labor laws that do
not distinguish between citizens and aliens in their application. In McCulloch v. Sociedad
Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 21 (1963) (National Labor Relations Act)
and Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, 353 U.S. 138, 147 (1957) (Labor Management Rela-
tions Act), the Supreme Court stated that it would not "run interference in... a delicate field
of international relations" by applying U.S. labor laws to benefit foreign seamen on foreign flag
vessels. Boureslan, 857 F.2d at 1030 (King, J., dissenting) (quoting Benz 353 U.S. at 147).
302. Boureslan, 857 F.2d at 1030 (King, J., dissenting); see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (1988).
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language and have thus been denied extraterritorial application.30 3 Because
the alien exemption provision explicitly exempts aliens employed abroad by
otherwise covered employers, there is no possibility that the extraterritorial
application of Title VII would intrude upon the specific labor relations of
foreign nations. 3° Moreover, Judge King argued that the BFOQ exception
in Title VII a"5 provides a built-in mechanism which minimizes potential
conflicts with foreign law,3°" thus further demonstrating the reasonableness
of applying Title VII extraterritorially.3 °7
In concluding that the extraterritorial application of Title VII to United
States corporations employing United States citizens would be reasonable
under principles of international law, Judge King examined the language
and legislative history of Title VII to determine whether Boureslan demon-
strated a threshold showing of a clear congressional intent to overcome the
presumption against extraterritoriality.3"' Judge King's analysis, which fo-
cused primarily on the alien exemption provision, demonstrated that Con-
gress, by expressly exempting aliens employed abroad, fully intended to
303. Boureslan, 857 F.2d at 1030 (King, J., dissenting). Judge King mentioned that the
labor laws, relied upon by the majority, which have been held not to apply extraterritorially
were distinguishable from Title VII on the following grounds: the Railway Labor Act (RLA)
"incorporates a provision of the Interstate Commerce Act which explicitly restricts its applica-
tion to carriers engaged in transportation within the United States." Id. at n.21. The Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) is devoid of a provision similar to the alien ex-
emption provision of Title VII. Id. Congress amended the ADEA, however, in 1984 to explic-
itly provide for extraterritorial application. Older Americans Act Amendments of 1984, Pub.
L. No. 98-459, 98 Stat. 1767, 1792 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 623(h), 630(f)
(1988)).
304. Boureslan, 857 F.2d at 1030 (King, J., dissenting). In Foley Bros., the Supreme Court
argued that the lack of a distinction between citizens and aliens in the statute indicated that it
"was intended to apply only to those places where the labor conditions of both citizen and
alien employees are a probable concern of Congress. Such places do not include foreign coun-
tries...." 336 U.S. at 286. Basically, the Supreme Court argued that if Congress intended to
apply the Eight Hour Law extraterritorially, it should have made clear that it intended the
statute to apply to aliens within the United States ("where the labor conditions of both citizens
and alien employees are a probable concern of Congress") and not to foreign citizens in foreign
countries. By exempting coverage of aliens employed abroad by U.S. employers under Title
VII, it seems that Congress adhered to the Supreme Court's guidance in Foley Bros. and nar-
rowly tailored Title VII to reach U.S. citizens employed in foreign countries.
305. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (198); see supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
306. Boureslan, 857 F.2d at 1030 (King, J., dissenting).
307. Id.; see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 403(2)(h) ("the likelihood of conflict with regulation by another state."). As noted
in Kern v. Dynalectron Corp., 577 F. Supp. 1196 (N.D. Tex. 1983), aff'd mem., 746 F.2d 810
(5th Cir. 1984), actions mandated by foreign law will be recognized as an affirmative defense to
a Title VII claim.
308. Boureslan, 857 F.2d at 1031-34 (King, J., dissenting).
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provide protection to United States citizens, wherever employed, who are
otherwise covered by the Act. 3 9
V. AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE ALTERNATIVE FRAMEWORK: THE
CONCEPT OF DEFERENCE TO ADMINISTRATIVE
CONSTRUCTIONS OF AMBIGUOUS STATUTORY
PROVISIONS
The Boureslan opinion is significant to an analysis of the extraterritorial
application of Title VII, and transnational employment rights in general,
because it represents the courts' reluctance to interfere with the internal
management decisions of multinational corporations operating overseas.3 °
A number of reasons may justify this hesitation to proscribe intracorporate
employment policies of companies located far from the territorial jurisdic-
tion of the United States.3"' Typically, multinational corporations operating
abroad draw upon the local labor force to satisfy a portion of their employ-
ment needs. Imposing the requirement of compliance with United States
fair employment laws respecting Americans employed by these companies,
while not similarly guaranteeing to the local labor force these equal opportu-
nities for employment, creates a dilemma for United States corporations
abroad.312 A corporation's more favorable treatment of American employ-
ees could involve assertions of favoritism and weaken the morale of the local
workforce. If the labor laws of the foreign country are comparable to our
own, then these problems may not exist; in that case, American employees
may be protected by similarly favorable foreign laws. Practically, however,
the latter instance may not arise because the main motivation for corpora-
tions locating abroad, the less restrictive nature of the particular foreign
country's national labor policy, may be defeated.313
A typical argument advanced to demonstrate the reasonableness of apply-
ing United States labor laws to corporations abroad is that, where the corpo-
309. Id.
310. The court noted that "[r]equiring American employers to comply with Title VII in
such a country could well leave American corporations the difficult choice of either refusing to
employ United States citizens in the country or discontinuing business." Id. at 1020 (Davis, J.,
majority).
311. Note, The Domestic and Extraterritorial Application of United States Employment Dis-
crimination to Multinational Corporations, 4 CONN. J. INT'L L. 145, 181 ("corporations assert
that application of Title VII and the ADEA to their operations abroad will blunt their compet-
itive edge.") (citing Cleary v. United States Lines, Inc., 555 F. Supp. 1251, 1263 (D.N.J. 1983),
aff'd, 728 F.2d 607 (3d Cir. 1984)).
312. Boureslan, 857 F.2d at 1020; see supra note 314.
313. P. LINDERT, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 571 (8th ed. 1986) ("The freedom to re-
place source-country production and jobs with production and jobs in other countries is partic-
ularly exercised by firms faced with strong labor organizations in the source country.").
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ration is not subject to a conflicting requirement of foreign law, such
application will not force employers to discriminate between their foreign
and American employees.314 Guaranteeing both groups of employees simi-
lar rights and benefits, guided by the principles embodied in our own em-
ployment laws, would eliminate any disparity in treatment and serve both
domestic and international goals of human rights.315 This argument, how-
ever, ignores the fact that, in many situations, overseas United States em-
ployers find it necessary to guarantee greater benefits to Americans to make
the prospects of a foreign assignment more attractive. Moreover, such an
argument tends to defeat the purpose in locating abroad in the first place:
the availability of cost-effective sources of labor less hampered by the re-
quirements of United States labor laws.316
The majority opinion in Boureslan may have tacitly acknowledged these
considerations as part of their refusal to apply Title VII to Boureslan's claim
of discrimination. In any event, the Boureslan opinion remains significant in
two respects. First, as the first circuit court of appeals to consider explicitly
the issue of Title VII's extraterritorial reach, the court's decision represents a
crushing blow to the previous successful efforts of the EEOC to extend the
jurisdictional reach of the Act to an emerging area of interest in United
States fair employment law: transnational employment.317 Moreover, as
Judge King's dissent in Boureslan recognized, the eventual resolution of this
issue will involve more than the mere application of principles of statutory
construction.318 Successful implementation of Title VII to acts of employ-
ment discrimination abroad requires a case by case analysis in which consid-
erations of foreign policy, international conflicts of laws, and adherence to
international norms play a significant role. 31 9 The principal legacy of the
Boureslan opinion is the alternative analytical framework, provided by Judge
King, for evaluating the issue of the extraterritorial application of any stat-
ute, and ultimately Judge King's analysis of the reasonableness in applying
Title VII to acts of employment discrimination abroad.320
Finally, in evaluating the issue of the extraterritorial application of Title
VII, no analysis would be complete without consideration of the concept of
judicial deference to the administrative agency interpretations of ambiguous
314. See Note, supra note 311, at 183.
315. See Note, supra note 2, at 1330.
316. See LINDERT, supra note 313.
317. Street, International Commercial and Labor Migration Requirements As a Bar to Dis-
criminatory Employment Practices, 31 HOWARD L.J. 497, 521-23 (1988).
318. Boureslan v. Aramco, 857 F.2d 1014, 1034-35 (King, J., dissenting), cert. granted sub
nom. EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., Ill S. Ct. 40 (1990).
319. Id. at 1021-35.
320. Id. at 1024-31.
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statutory provisions.32 ' Because the courts usually give great deference to
the EEOC's interpretation of Title VII, 322 the Commission's interpretation
of the alien exemption provision should similarly be given the deference it
deserves. If one takes the position that the language of the provision is am-
biguous, a further reason for supporting the EEOC's interpretation of the
exemption emerges. In EEOC v. Commercial Office Products Co., 323 the
Supreme Court held that the courts will defer to the EEOC's interpretation
of ambiguous language appearing within Title VII, as long as the interpreta-
tion is reasonable. 324 The Court specified that a determination of the reason-
ableness of the interpretation requires support from the language of the Act,
as well as the articulated purposes of the Act found within its legislative
history.325 Because the references in the legislative history of the Act, the
purposes behind the alien exemption provision, and the definitional sections
of the Act support the EEOC's interpretation of the provision, courts should
grant due deference to the Commission's opinion.
The federal courts have construed the alien exemption provision in two
different fashions.3 26 Some courts interpreting the provision have held that
the express exclusion of aliens employed abroad indicates a congressional
intent to provide aliens employed within the United States judicial and ad-
ministrative recourse for acts of employment discrimination.3 27 Other
courts have held that the provision evinces a congressional intent to cover
American citizens employed outside the United States by covered employ-
ers.32' Although the two interpretations are not wholly inconsistent, the
perception that this provision is ambiguous remains. The provision's suscep-
tibility to two different meanings supports its equivocality. The inherent
compatibility of the interpretations does not require the exclusion of one
interpretation while favoring the other. The interpretation of the provision
advanced by the EEOC, that the alien exemption provision indicates Con-
gress' intent to apply the Act abroad, however, is the more reasonable of the
two interpretations.
Judge King, in her Boureslan dissent, noted that Congress would have
violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the
United States Constitution if it had excluded resident aliens from the protec-
321. See supra notes 111-15 and accompanying text.
322. Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 94 (1983); see also supra notes 111-15 and
accompanying text.
323. 486 U.S. 107 (1988).
324. Id. at 115-16.
325. Id.
326. See supra notes 51-65 and accompanying text.
327. See supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
328. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
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tions of Title VII without sufficiently justifying such a distinction between
aliens and citizens a29 Aliens, as well as citizens, are entitled to equal protec-
tion under the laws of the United States, including Title VII, by the four-
teenth amendment. 330 Because employers would be covered by Title VII
when employing aliens within the United States regardless of the alien ex-
emption provision, interpreting the provision to protect aliens within the
United States is superfluous and, thus, violates principles of statutory
construction.
As Judge King noted, a violation of statutory construction occurs when
an interpretation of a provision renders that provision meaningless.331
When one possible construction of a statutory provision produces an unrea-
sonable result or deprives the provision of substance, another interpretation
should be favored. 332 Because the law favors rational and sensible construc-
tions of statutory provisions 333 and presumes that the legislature does not
act futilely, 334 an interpretation of the alien exemption provision as evidence
of congressional intent to cover aliens employed within the United States
would emasculate the effectiveness of the provision.
Interpreting the provision to protect United States citizens employed
abroad, however, produces a logical and just result which is clearly consis-
tent with the purposes and policies of the Act.3 35 An analysis of the factors
329. Boureslan v. Aramco, 857 F.2d 1014, 1033 (King, J., dissenting), cert. granted sub
nom. EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 111 S. Ct. 40 (1990). Relying on the opinion of the
Supreme Court in Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 95 (1983), Judge King noted that
"the use of the term 'individual' in defining 'employee' is sufficient to bring aliens within the
statute's coverage." Boureslan, 857 F.2d at 1033. Moreover, for the purposes of the fifth and
fourteenth amendments, aliens are considered persons "entitled to the equal protection of the
laws of the United States." Id. (citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886); Truax v.
Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915)).
330. Boureslan, 857 F.2d at 1033 (King, J., dissenting).
331. Id. at 1032. Judge King stated that superfluous interpretations of statutory provi-
sions violate the "established rule of statutory construction which obliges a court 'to give ef-
fect, if possible, to every word Congress used.'" Id. (quoting Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442
U.S. 330, 339 (1979)).
332. See Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970); Commissioner of Internal Revenue v.
Brown, 380 U.S. 563 (1965); United States v. Reeves, 752 F.2d 995, 998 (5th Cir.) ("a statute
should be read to avoid rendering its language redundant if reasonably possible"), cert. denied,
474 U.S. 834 (1985); Goff v. Taylor, 706 F.2d 574, 587 n.34 (5th Cir. 1983) ("[i]t is well
established that a statute should be construed so that each of its provisions is given full effect;
interpretations which render parts of a statute inoperative or superfluous are to be avoided");
Marsano v. Laird, 412 F.2d 65 (2d Cir. 1969) ("an interpretation which emasculates a provi-
sion of a statute is not to be preferred .... ").
333. American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63 (1982).
334. See Markham v. Cabell, 326 U.S. 404 (1945); Singer v. United States, 323 U.S. 338
(1945); Davies Warehouse Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 144 (1944).
335. See supra notes 13-14, 46-50 and accompanying text.
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enumerated in Commercial Office Products Co. 336 to determine the reasona-
bleness of an agency's interpretation of an ambiguous statutory provision
indicates that the EEOC's interpretation of the alien exemption provision is
amply supported by the language of the other sections of Title VII, specifi-
cally the statutory definitions of "employer ' 3 , "employee'' a , and "com-
merce". 339  The extreme breadth of these definitions indicates their
capability of including an overseas United States corporation and its United
States employees. Also, scattered throughout the legislative history of the
Act are numerous references which indicate a congressional intent to cover
entities engaged in foreign commerce and to protect all individuals capable
of being covered by the Act from discriminatory employment practices. 34°
Moreover, nowhere in the Act are United States corporations operating
abroad expressly excluded from Title VII coverage.
The reasonableness of the EEOC's interpretation of the alien exemption
provision becomes self-evident in light of the articulated congressional pur-
pose behind the alien exemption provision. The legislative history indicates
that Congress included this exemption within Title VII to prevent possible
conflicts with the laws of other nations which might otherwise arise if Title
VII applied to foreign nationals employed by United States employers
abroad.34 1 As Judge King noted, this congressional statement of purpose
indicates that the elimination of conflicts of laws with respect to aliens
abroad abolishes "any obstacles to protecting [United States] citizens em-
ployed abroad by [United States] corporations. ,34' Thus, the legislative his-
tory of the alien exemption provision, the purpose behind the provision, and
the language of other sections in Title VII adequately support the EEOC's
interpretation of the provision as an affirmative expression of congressional
intent to cover United States citizens employed abroad by United States cor-
porations. Because this interpretation is reasonable in light of the Commer-
cial Office Products Co. factors, the courts should defer to the EEOC's
position and apply Title VII extraterritorially.
336. 486 U.S. 107 (1988).
337. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1988); see supra note 17.
338. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (1988); see supra note 20 and accompanying text.
339. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(g) (1988); see supra note 22 and accompanying text.
340. See supra notes 40-50 and accompanying text.
341. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
342. Boureslan v. Aramco, 857 F.2d 1014, 1034 (1988) (King, J., dissenting), cert. granted
sub nom. EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 111 S. Ct. 40 (1990).
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VI. CONCLUSION
The civil rights laws enacted by Congress are intended to eliminate the
debilitating barriers that discrimination presents to the full enjoyment of the
rights and privileges guaranteed to individuals within our country. In par-
ticular, by ensuring equality in employment opportunities, Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 represents a concerted effort by Congress to remove
the severe economic hurdle that discrimination imposes on social advance-
ment. Yet the relics of discriminatory employment practices remain, and
now, with the steady export of United States corporations and American
employees, these vestigial practices may yet find a haven on foreign soil.
Surely, the rights of United States citizens are not restrained by the borders
they cross as they seek employment opportunities abroad. Such a proposi-
tion is anomalous in light of the broad remedial purposes of Title VII.
What may seem a foregone conclusion regarding the extraterritorial appli-
cation of Title VII in actuality, however, represents a quagmire in the field of
United States fair employment law. This confusion is attributable in part to
the recent Fifth Circuit evaluation of the issue in Boureslan v. Aramco. The
majority opinion in Boureslan not only affronts the equality of Americans,
but also defeats the successful efforts of the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission to extend the broad remedial protections of Title VII to an
emerging area of concern for the United States. The express language of the
statute, as well as the historical legislative references to the purposes under-
lying the Act, evince Congress' intent that Title VII reach American em-
ployers engaged in foreign commerce. Moreover, a meaningful
interpretation of the alien exemption provision commands the inference that
Americans employed by such corporations be fully protected from acts of
employment discrimination during their tenure of employment abroad. In
the absence of actual conflicts with foreign law, application of Title VII ex-
traterritorially is reasonable under the principles of international law.
American employees should not be expected to leave their civil rights behind
them when accepting a foreign post with a United States employer, neither
should such employers seek to shirk their responsibilities under the laws of
the United States by locating abroad.
Adam M. Mycyk
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